United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez,
432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2005) (Florida conviction
of aggravated battery under § 784.045 of the Florida Statutes
is divisible, as the statute may be violated by any assault
on a pregnant woman, including spitting, which does not involve
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and therefore
may not be an aggravated felony crime of violence for sentencing
purposes).

Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d
234 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (Texas conviction of assault,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3) ("intentionally
or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will
regard the contact as offensive or provocative"), did
not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Urias-Escobar,
281 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.
2377 (2002) (Texas conviction for misdemeanor assault with
bodily injury, with one year suspended sentence imposed, was
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F) that warranted an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672
(9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (Indiana conviction of battery, under
Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1, is not categorically a crime of
violence for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence),
because the offense can be committed by a mere offensive touching).

United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th
Cir. Mar. 24, 1999) (Iowa conviction of misdemeanor assault,
under Iowa Code § 708.1(1), which may be committed by "[a]ny
act which is . . . intended to result in physical contact
which will be insulting or offensive to another," by
necessity, requires physical force to complete, and is thus
sufficient physical force to constitute a crime of violence
for purposes of 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1077
(9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (Washington Assault in the Third
Degree is not a crime of violence for sentencing purposes
since the statute may be violated through an unlawful touching
that does not involve substantial physical force or seriously
risk physical injury).

Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219
(9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (California conviction of mayhem,
under California Penal Code § 203, punishing unlawful and
malicious disfigurement or dismemberment, is an aggravated
felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).

United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063
(9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003) (Wyoming battery conviction: domestic
relationship not a required element in order for Wyoming battery
conviction to serve as a predicate offense under the 18 U.S.C.

United States v.
Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 544 (W.D.Va. Oct. 13, 2000) (Massachusetts
conviction of Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous
Weapon, with a sentence of five years and one day, was a "crime
of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore constituted
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing an illegal re-entry
sentence).

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d
___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction
of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §
120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument"], does not constitute an aggravated felony
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C.