Popal v. Gonzalez, 416
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction
of simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania
Penal Code § 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony
crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea
of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft,
327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (Connecticut conviction
of third-degree assault in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1)
of the Connecticut General Statutes, which involves the intentional
infliction of physical injury upon another, is not a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and is therefore not an
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904, 121 S.Ct.
2246 (2001) (Rhode Island misdemeanor simple assault conviction,
for which suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal
re-entry sentence for violation of INA § 276(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.

Milbin v. Ashcroft, 293 F.Supp.2d 158
(D.Conn. Dec. 2, 2003) (Connecticut conviction under any subdivision
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61, which prohibits various ways
of causing injury to a person, did not constitute a crime
of violence within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C.

Santapaola v. Ashcroft, 249
F.Supp.2d 181 (D.Conn. Mar. 13, 2003) (Connecticut conviction
for risk of injury, in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21(1),
constituted an aggravated felony conviction for a "crime
of violence," under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for deportation purposes).

Persaud v. McElroy, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2002) (New York conviction
of assault with injury under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(6) was
not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it
did not require, as an element of the offense, that the defendant
use physical force to inflict the injury, and the conviction
was therefore not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2003) (Virginia conviction of carnal
knowledge of a child between 13 and 15 years of age, in violation
of Virginia Code § 18.2-63, constituted a "crime of violence"
under U.S.S.G.

Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533
(3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction
of simple assault, under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(3)
("A person is guilty of assault if he . . . attempts
by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury."), constituted a crime of violence, under
18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Lisbey v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d
930 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (California conviction of sexual
battery under California Penal Code § 243.4 constitutes an
aggravated felony for removal purposes, as the offense involves
a substantial risk of physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b));
but see United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926 (9th
Cir. Aug.

Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580
(11th Cir. June 21, 1995) (per curiam) (Florida conviction
of attempted lewd assault, in violation of F.S.A. § 777.04(1),
800.04(1), was crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and
therefore aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of deportation).