Matter of Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448
(BIA June 4, 2002) (en banc) (New York misdemeanor conviction
sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of New York
Penal Law § 130.60(2), constitutes "sexual abuse of a
minor" and is therefore an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA Sept. 16, 1999) (en banc) (Texas
conviction of indecency with a child by exposure of private
parts, pursuant to section 21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal
Code, constitutes sexual abuse of a minor and is therefore
an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).

Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.Supp.2d 442 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 29, 2005) (New York conviction for "use of a child
in a sexual performance" under New York Penal Law § 263.05,
did not constitute an offense relating to child pornography,
and was therefore not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(I),
8 U.S.C.

Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. Jul. 14, 2006)
(Massachusetts conviction of statutory rape of 14-year-old
girl, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

United States v. Yanez Saucedo, 295 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. July
8, 2002) (Washington conviction of third-degree rape, in violation
of Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.44.060, was an "aggravated felony"
as rape under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A),
to trigger sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. June 30, 2000)
(California rape conviction under California Penal Code §
261(a)(3) constitutes an "aggravated felony" within
the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A) for deportation purposes,
though the elements of the state and federal statutes are
not identical).

Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438
F.3d 86 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (Rhode Island conviction
of third-degree sexual assault, in violation of R.I. Gen.

United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d
789 (3d Cir. Apr.

Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833 (4th
Cir. May 4, 2000) (Virginia conviction of misdemeanor sexual
battery, in violation of Va.Code 1950, § 18.2-67.4, was a
crime of violence, and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration
purposes precluding judicial review of a removal order), distinguished
by Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001).

United
States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2006) (Minnesota felony conviction for third degree
sexual conduct, under Minn. Stat. 8 § 609.344, is not necessarily
a "forcible sex offense," and therefore not categorically
a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).