Matter of Alcantar, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 801 (BIA May 25, 1994) (Illinois conviction
for involuntary manslaughter under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,
para. 9-3(a), with a sentence to 10 years in prison, constituted
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and
an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

United States v. Morgan, 380 F.3d 698 (2d
Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (New York conviction for second-degree
attempted murder, with sentence to indeterminate term of two-and-a-half
to seven-and-a-half years imprisonment, properly treated
as an "aggravated felony" for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes, even though it was not an aggravated felony under
the relevant immigration statute at the time of the conviction).

Ng v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.
Feb. 7, 2006) (federal conviction of use of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, constitutes a crime of violence aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Castiglia v. INS, 108 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1997) (second-degree
murder conviction constituted aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (Florida:
conviction of third-degree murder constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A),
for deportation purposes).

Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (BIA Aug. 18, 1998)
(Texas conviction of attempted murder constitutes aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)
for deportation purposes).

United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa,
386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2004) (Texas conviction of
criminally negligent homicide, under Tex. Penal Code § 19.05,
did not constitute crime of violence aggravated felony under
U.S.S.G.

Bazan-Reyes v.
INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. July 5, 2001) (Wisconsin conviction
for homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle, in violation of
Wis.St.1996, § 940.09, was not an aggravated felony crime
of violence, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for deportation purposes, since offense required that offender
actually hit someone, but did not require that he intentionally
use force to achieve that result).

Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710 (8th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (Minnesota conviction of criminal vehicular
homicide, in violation of M.S.A. § 609.21, subd. 1(4), was
a crime of violence, and therefore was an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
removal purposes).

United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th
Cir. Oct. 24, 1994) (federal conviction of manslaughter is
a crime of violence within meaning of federal sentencing statute
different from 18 U.S.C. § 16 and the aggravated felony definition
contained in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).