Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. Jun. 29, 2007) (court recognizes the DHS will follow Pickering even in the Fifth Circuit: "we vacated the Discipio I opinion because the Government modified its position and terminated deportation proceedings against Discipio because his conviction had been vacated on procedural and substantive defects, the Government bowing to the BIA's opinion in In re Pickering.FN10 See Discipio II, 417 F.3d at 449-50.")

"The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is proposing newly formulated Codes of Conduct for the immigration judges of the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge and for the Board members of the Board of Immigration Appeals. EOIR is seeking public comment on the codes before final publication. ... Comments may be submitted not later than July 30, 2007." FR, June 28, 2007.
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo...

Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. Jun. 27, 2007) (New York conviction for fourth-degree solicitation to sell drugs in violation of the state's generic solicitation statute, N.Y. Penal Law 100.05(1), constituted a conviction relating to a controlled substance, and rendered him inadmissible to the United States pursuant to INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)).

Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. May 8, 2007) (rule of lenity in interpreting immigration statutes is a last resort, used only when the other rules of statutory construction leave a statute ambiguous; Chevron rule of deference can be used to interpret an ambiguous provision prior to using the rule of lenity).

The regulations do not specifically address the issue of joinder or consolidation, but the Immigration Judge has wide latitude to order consolidation if necessary to promote administrative efficiency. Matter of Taerghodsi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 260, 262-63 (BIA 1977) (citing former 8 C.F.R. 242.8(a)). Consolidation is proper when two or more hearings share the same or substantially similar evidence and material to matters at issue. 28 C.F.R. 68.16.

United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. May 7, 2007) (bringing a noncitizen to the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2), is a continuing offense that terminates when the initial transporter who brings the alien to the United States drops off the person at a location in this country), overruling United States v. Ramirez-Martinez, 273 F.3d 903, and United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786.

United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007) (adjudication of delinquency of a juvenile Mexican national for transporting illegal aliens and related counts is reversed, and the juvenile information dismissed, where the juvenile was deprived of his rights under the Juvenile Delinquency Act to immediate notification and prompt arraignment, and to the advice and counsel of a responsible adult prior to interrogation; and a resulting confession was highly prejudicial and should not have been used against him to initiate his proceedings).

United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, ___, (8th Cir. May 9, 2007) (Minnesota conviction for second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn.Stat. 609.205, did not qualify as crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not an "aggravated felony," under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since it does not have as an essential element the intentional use of force: "Under Minnesota law, a person can commit second-degree manslaughter without using force or risking the intentional use of force. Minn.Stat. 609.205.

United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, ___ n.4, (8th Cir. May 9, 2007) ("substantial risk" test for crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), is not met by substantial risk of causing physical injury; it requires ignoring "the [substantial] risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime."), quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hudson, 414 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1769 (2006); compare United States v.

Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Texas. Crim. App. 1991) (conjunctive pleading represents an alternative pleading of the differing methods of committing one offense" and allows the jury to return "a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted"). See also Omari v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303 (5th Cir.