United States v.
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 323 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2003)
(Texas conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,
in violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a), is not a
crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d
309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002) (en banc) (Texas conviction of
simple motor vehicle theft was not a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G.

United States v. Charles, 275 F.3d
468 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2001) (conviction of vehicle theft
was "crime of violence" under special guideline
for offense presenting "serious potential risk of injury
to another," different from illegal re-entry Guidelines,
governing enhancement to sentence for ex-felon in possession
of firearm conviction), vacated in part upon en banc rehearing,
301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002).

United States v. Jackson,
220 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. July 26, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
988, 121 S.Ct. 1640 (2001) (Texas conviction of unauthorized
use of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 31.07,
was a "crime of violence" as that term is defined
in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which is different from the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 16), overruled by United States v. Charles,
301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir.

United States v.
Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 837 (1999) (conviction of unauthorized use
of motor vehicle is "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and 18 U.S.C. 16(b), for purposes sentence
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d
460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1111
(2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent
to commit theft constituted "attempt," under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit a "theft
offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)
for purposes of enhancing under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Lucio-Lucio,
347 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. Oct. 28, 2003) (Texas felony conviction
of driving while intoxicated is not an aggravated felony crime
of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

Tapia-Garcia v. INS,
237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 2001) (Idaho conviction
of DUI drugs or alcohol offense, in violation of section 18-8004(5)
of the Idaho Code, constituted a crime of violence and was
therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering deportation).

United States v. Rubio,
317 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2003) (driving under the
influence with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence
for purposes of the career offender provisions of the sentencing
Guidelines).

Le v.
U.S. Atty. Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 1999) (Florida
conviction of driving under the influence with serious bodily
injury, in violation of F.S.A. § 316.193(3), was a "crime
of violence," under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as required to
be an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).