United States v. Torres-Ruiz,
387 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (California conviction
for felony driving under the influence of alcohol did not
constitute a "crime of violence" for purposes of
enhancing a federal sentence for illegal re-entry).

Supreme Court

Leocal
v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377 (Nov. 9, 2004) (Florida
conviction of driving under the influence and accidentally
causing serious bodily injury, in violation of Florida Stats.
Ann. § 316.193(3)(c), did not constitute an aggravated felony
as a crime of violence, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Dalton v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. July 20, 2001) (New York conviction
of driving while intoxicated, in violation of New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1192.3, did not necessarily constitute a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), since
a risk of the use of force is not an integral part of the
offense, and was thus not an aggravated felony under INA §
101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Vargas-Duran,
356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2004) (en banc) (Texas conviction
of intoxication assault - "by accident or mistake, while
operating an aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicle in a public
place while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxication causes
serious bodily injury to another." - in violation of
Tex.

United States v. Vargas-Duran,
319 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2003) (Texas conviction for
intoxication assault, which requires proof that an intoxicated
offender "cause[] serious bodily injury to another,"
in violation of Penal Code Ann. § 49.07, qualified as a "crime
of violence," for purposes of the 16-level sentencing
enhancement under U.S.S.G.

Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972-974 (9th Cir.
May 14, 2001) (federal conviction for money laundering $1,310
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A) did not constitute
an "aggravated felony," even though defendant was
ordered to pay $967,753.39 in restitution, because, under
INA § 101(a)(43)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), the amount
of funds laundered must exceed $10,000).

Oguejiofor v. Attorney General of U.S., 277 F.3d
1305 (11th Cir. Jan. 2, 2002) (conviction of obstruction of
justice constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) for removal purposes).

Matter of Espinoza, 22
I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA June 11, 1999) (en banc) (federal
conviction for misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4
does not constitute a conviction for an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), as an
offense relating to obstruction of justice), distinguishing
Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA
July 15, 1997)).

Matter of Joseph,
22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA May 28, 1999) ("[I]t
is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing
or hindering ones own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction
of justice aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").