Oguejiofor v. Attorney General of U.S., 277 F.3d
1305 (11th Cir. Jan. 2, 2002) (conviction of obstruction of
justice constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) for removal purposes).
Matter of Espinoza, 22
I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA June 11, 1999) (en banc) (federal
conviction for misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4
does not constitute a conviction for an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), as an
offense relating to obstruction of justice), distinguishing
Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA
July 15, 1997)).
Matter of Joseph,
22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA May 28, 1999) ("[I]t
is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing
or hindering ones own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction
of justice aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").
Matter of Batista-Hernandez,
21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA July 15, 1997) (federal conviction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 as accessory after the fact to a
drug-trafficking crime establishes deportability as an aggravated
felony under former INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), because the offense
of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of
an obstruction of justice crime under INA § 101(a)(43)(S),
8 U.S.C.
United States v. Rodriguez-Duberney,
326 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2003) (federal: since courts
consideration of whether a prior conviction constitutes a
drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)
does not require a determination whether the offense "by
its nature" fits a certain definition, contrary to the
question whether a conviction constitutes a "crime of
violence" under 18 U.S.C.
Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir.
Feb. 22, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) (federal
conviction of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering
enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), was an "aggravated
felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J),
for immigration purposes).
Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. Feb.
23, 2004) (federal conviction of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, "defeating
a tax" is an offense "relating to tax evasion,"
under that statute, and therefore constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), for removal purposes
because "defeating a tax" and "evading a tax"
are interchangeable terms).
Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 232 F.Supp.2d 30
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2002) (federal conviction of attempt to
evade or defeat tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, charged
as attempting to avoid an amount of tax liability in excess
of $300,000, constituted an aggravated felony, under INA §
101(a)(43)(M)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii), for deportation
purposes).
Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 204 F.Supp.2d
405, 406 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2002) (federal convictions of conspiracy
to impede the IRS in collection of income and payroll taxes
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, failure to collect or pay
income/FICA taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202, and attempt
to evade or defeat tax in violation of 26 U.S.C.
Lee v. United States, 368
F.3d 218 (3d Cir. May 19, 2004) (federal conviction of filing
false income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1),
is not an aggravated felony, as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), for immigration purposes, as
INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) specifically
covers tax evasion, but INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), 8 U.S.C.