Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. May 7, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction of theft
by deception, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922(a),
with an indeterminate sentence from a minimum of six months
to a maximum of 23 months, does not trigger removal as an
aggravated felony fraud conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i),
8 U.S.C.

United States v. Wenner, 351
F.3d 969 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003) (Washington conviction of
residential burglary, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.025(1),
is not a "burglary of a dwelling" crime of violence
as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), since the statute classifies
railway cars, fenced areas, and cargo containers as dwellings
although they are not structures under Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S.

United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug.
12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary,
in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of automobile, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04 (1994),
was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of nonresidential building in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 30.02 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Guadardo,
40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994) (Texas conviction of burglary
of habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 was
a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation).

Rios-Delgado v. United States, 117 F.Supp.2d 581 (W.D.Tex.
Oct. 11, 2000) (California: trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to object, at sentencing, that defendants prior
conviction for commercial burglary was not an aggravated felony,
for sentence enhancement purposes, under the soon-to-be-announced
rule of United States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826 (5th
Cir.

United States v. Alvarez-Martinez, 286
F.3d 470 (7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2002) (Illinois burglary conviction,
in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/19-1(a), was a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and thus an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes
of sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Martinez-Garcia,
268 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1111 (2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle
with intent to commit theft constituted "attempt,"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit
a "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G) for purposes of enhancing under U.S.S.G.

Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869
(7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (Illinois conviction of "burglary"
of automobile, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/19-1(a), was not
an aggravated felony "burglary offense" under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) that would trigger
deportation).