United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, ___
F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1966655 (5th Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Arkansas
conviction of burglary, in violation of Ark.Code Ann.

United States v. Guzman-Landeros,
207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2000) (Texas convictions
for burglary of vehicle constituted aggravated felonies as
crimes of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to sentence for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez,
434 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2006) (Washington conviction
of second-degree burglary, under Wash. Rev.

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2005) (California burglary conviction under the modified categorical analysis included the unlawful entry requirement absent in California's statutory definition of burglary, since the defendant pleaded guilty to the unlawful entry language of the charge, so the conviction met the definition of "burglary of a dwelling" under Taylor and is, therefore, a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n.

United States v. Matthews, 374 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. July 7, 2004) (conviction of burglary of an occupied
building did not constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2), where the parties agreed the term "occupied"
did not require a persons actual physical presence).

Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591
(5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of
vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with
sentence of five years deferred adjudication, constituted
crime of violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes
of deportation).

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
364 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (California conviction
for burglary of an inhabited building, under California Penal
Code § 460, is an aggravated felony and a "crime of violence"
for sentencing purposes).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th
Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas
conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended
sentence of four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient
to render noncitizen deportable).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d
788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069, 121
S.Ct. 757 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle
with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 30.04(a) (West 1987), with suspended sentence of four years
imprisonment, was a "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v. Ramos-Garcia,
95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1083 (1997) (Texas conviction for burglary of vehicle in violation
of Penal Code § 30.04 (1993) was an "aggravated felony
" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) sentence enhancement
for illegal re-entry after deportation, despite change in
Texas law, Texas Penal Code Ann.