United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug.
12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary,
in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. June 14, 2002) (California conviction
of violating Penal Code § 459 (burglary) not a crime of violence
for purposes of federal career criminal enhancement of bank
robbery sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a), where
record of conviction did not establish that burglary was of
a dwelling).

Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. June
9, 2000) (California conviction of vehicle burglary in violation
of California Penal Code § 459 did not constitute "burglary"
within the federal aggravated felony definition, INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), nor "crime of violence"
within INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes).

United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325
(9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (California Information charging
burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege
"unlawful or unprivileged" entry).

United States v. Cornelio-Pena,
435 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Arizona conviction
of solicitation to commit second-degree burglary of a dwelling,
in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1002, 1507, is a crime
of violence under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 312 F.3d
1167 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2002) (conviction of burglary of a
dwelling constitutes a crime of violence, and thus an aggravated
felony conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2.L1.2, comment n. 1(B)(ii)(II) (2001)).

United States v. Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d
875 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 1993) (Texas burglary conviction was
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and
thus an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry conviction).

United States v. Fuentes-Rivera,
323 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2003) (California conviction
for burglary of an inhabited dwelling under Penal Code §
459, 460(a), was a "crime of violence," for purposes
of a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1325
(BIA June 6, 2000) (en banc) (Texas conviction of burglary
of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(a),
is not an aggravated felony "burglary offense" within
the definition of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.
Jan. 23, 2002) (federal conviction for embezzling, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 656, in excess of $400,000 in cash and checks
from employer was not a fraud offense aggravated felony as
defined in section INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i),
for immigration purposes).