Restrepo v. Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787, 796 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) ("we are unable to discern the clear and unmistakable intent of Congress with respect to the definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" [under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). Thus, we must look to the BIA's interpretation of the phrase and determine whether that interpretation is reasonable.").

Restrepo v. Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787, 796-797 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) ("We conclude that the BIA's definition of sexual abuse of a minor is a reasonable one and that it is appropriate to exercise Chevron deference. Accordingly, we will define sexual abuse of a minor by reference to 3509(a). . . .

Restrepo v. Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), is a generic definition which must be analyzed under the categorical approach, which ignores the facts of the case and concentrates on the elements of the offense of conviction); following Nijhawan v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 2300 (courts employ the "categorical approach" of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct.

United States v. Castro, 599 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2010) (California conviction for lewd acts with a child 14-15 years of age, under California Penal Code 288(c)(1), did not categorically constitute a "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore did not qualify as a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since sexual conduct with a 15 year old is not per se abusive), following Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Castro, 599 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2010) (California conviction for lewd acts with a child 14-15 years of age, under California Penal Code 288(c)(1), did not categorically constitute "statutory rape," and therefore did not qualify as a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the term "lewd acts" includes acts not included in 18 U.S.C. 2243, defining "sexual act" for purposes of defining "statutory rape"), following Estrada-Espinosa v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).

Ledezma-Garcia v. Holder, 599 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (Oregon conviction for sodomy in the first degree, in violation of Or.Rev.Stat. 163.405 (1988), constituted aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor for immigration purposes).

United States v. De La Cruz-Garcia, 590 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2010) (Colorado conviction of attempted sexual assault on a child, in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-3-405(1) ("Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim."), categorically constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1), that warranted a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement).

Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2009) (California conviction of "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor" under Penal Code 261.5(d) is not categorically a sexual abuse of a minor as defined in INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C.

Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2009) (Connecticut conviction for larceny, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-48 and 53a-123 was a "theft offense" for aggravated felony purposes; although the statute of conviction may be committed with intent to "deprive" or "appropriate," the court found that both terms meet the generic definition of theft: "criminal intent to deprive the owner [of property] of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent."), citing Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1346 (BIA 2000).

Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. Aug. 19, 2009) (court lacked jurisdiction to review BIAs finding that noncitizens federal conviction of unauthorized access to a computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4), qualified as a particularly serious crime).