United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2009) (generic definition of "kidnapping," under Guidelines, requires "(1) an act of restraining, removing, or confining another; and (2) an unlawful means of accomplishing that act [i.e., by force] . . . . The most common approach defines kidnapping to include [in addition] a particular nefarious purpose. And the majority approach requires some kind of heightened intent beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim's liberty.

United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) ("sexual abuse of a minor" is defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. 2243 in the context of a conviction for statutory rape, but not in other contexts of "sexual abuse of a minor.")

Gaiskov v. Holder, 567 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.

United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (California conviction of lewd act with a minor under 14, in violation of Penal Code 288(a), constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," qualifying as a "crime of violence" that warranted a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 in the sentence for illegal reentry after deportation), following United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (sexual abuse of a minor has the same meaning in the immigration and sentencing contexts - except as it concerns statutory rape in the immigration context; as generically defined, the term requires three elements - sexual conduct, against a minor, that constitutes abuse [physical or psychological harm]), distinguishing Estrada- Espinosa,546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008), which applied 18 U.S.C. 2243 to define "sexual abuse of a minor" in the context of a statutory rape conviction.

United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, 563 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) ("We need not decide here whether "minor" as used in the enumerated category of "sexual abuse of a minor" means those under sixteen versus those under seventeen. We can say that "minor" in this context does not include all persons under eighteennamely, seventeen-year-olds. We are mindful that in many contexts a minor is defined as a person under eighteen. See Blacks Law Dictionary 997 (6th ed. 1990) ("In most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18 . . . .").

United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2009) (Washington state conviction of statutory rape, in violation of Washington Revised Code 9A.44.079, did not constitute a "violent felony," so as to justify a sentence enhancement from 10 to 15 years for being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924, under the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), because that offense may involve consensual sexual intercourse).

Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2008) (federal conviction of Aiding and Abetting an Escape from Custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 751, did not categorically qualify as an "obstruction of justice" aggravated felony, within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), so respondent is therefore eligible for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a): "Because a violation of 18 U.S.C.

Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008), withdrawing previous opinion, 532 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. July 10, 2008) (federal conviction of failure to appear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146, qualifies as an aggravated felony obstruction of justice conviction, under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), if a sentence of one year or more was imposed, because the statute requires an intentional failure to appear; conviction is not an aggravated felony "failure to appear" conviction, under INA 101(a)(43)(T), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(T).)

Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008), withdrawing previous opinion, 532 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.