Plummer v. Ashcroft, 258 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.Conn. 2003) (Connecticut conviction of larceny in the second degree, in violation of CGSA 53a-123(a)(3), with a sentence imposed of one year or more, constitutes an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. Oct. 17. 2008) (en banc) ("a conviction which constitutes 'sexual abuse of a minor' must necessarily contain an element of abuse. We have previously construed the word 'abuse' as physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment' or use or treat[ment] so as to injure, hurt, or damage.") (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.

 
In Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. Oct. 17. 2008) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that a California conviction of consensual sex under the four penal statutes with a minor is overbroad in that it includes conduct that falls outside of the generic aggravated felony definition of a sexual abuse of a minor, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), and is therefore not categorically an aggravated felony under that theory for deportation purposes.

United States v. Ayala, 542 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), is sexual abuse of a minor, even though the statute punishes sex with a person that is one day shy of 18 years old), following United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000).

United States v. Ayala, 542 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), is sexual abuse of a minor, even though the statute punishes sex with a person that is one day shy of 18 years old), following United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000).

Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. Jul. 9, 2008) (New York conviction for first degree reckless endangerment [discharge of a firearm into the air] is a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal; a crime can be a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal even if it is not an aggravated felony).

The Ninth Circuit ordered that Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 498 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2007), be reheard en banc. The petition for rehearing, the amicus briefs, and the governments opposition are available on the Ninth Circuits website at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/174376a6245fda7888256ce5007d5470/a59aac6c107bc187882572c2005d1b26/$FILE/05-75850pfr.pdf

AILF has issued a new Practice Advisory that addresses Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2008), its current status, and preliminary strategies and arguments - both within and outside of the Ninth Circuit - to avoid its negative impact. In Orozco, the Ninth Circuit held that a non-citizen who obtains entry into the U.S. by fraudulent means is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under INA 245(a) because he or she has not been "admitted."
See http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/orozco-pa.pdf

Serna-Guerra v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2228868 (5th Cir. 2008) (Texas conviction for the unauthorized use of a vehicle, in violation of Tex. Pen. Code 31.07,constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for removal purposes, but "we urge and recommend that that precedent should be reconsidered and overruled by our en banc court."), reluctantly following Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Galvan- Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir.

The Ninth Circuit ordered that Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 498 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2007), be reheard en banc. In this case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found that a statutory rape conviction constituted an aggravated felony (sexual abuse of a minor). The court noted that it was bound by a prior panel decision, Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2002). In its May 6, 2008 order granting rehearing en banc, the court said, "[t]he three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit." The court heard argument on June 25, 2008.