United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a), [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a forcible sex offense, and thus cannot be a crime of violence as defined under the federal sentencing guidelines).
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir.
United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (Texas conviction for sexual assault of a child, under Texas Penal Code 22.011(a)(2), constitutes sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of illegal re-entry sentencing; minor in this instance is defined as commonly defined, e.g., a person under 18 years old).
Note: The noncitizen in this case did not challenge whether the statute was sexual or necessarily abusive.
Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838, 841 (BIA 2012) (crime relate[s] to obstruction of justice within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), if it includes the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice, irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding); reaffirming Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997); clarifying Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999).
United States v. Martinez-Zamaripa, 680 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. Jun. 1, 2012) (Oklahoma conviction of indecent proposal to a child, in violation of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 1123(A)(1) (1995) (any oral ... lewd or indecent proposal to any child under sixteen (16) years of age for the child to have unlawful sexual relations ... with any person.), constituted enumerated offense sexual abuse of a minor, under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. N. 1(B)(iii), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).
United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. Jun. 28, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of second-degree sexual assault, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. 5"14"125(a) (2002), is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act, since the elements of the statute necessarily involve either a use of force or substantial risk that force will be used).
Matter of MW, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012) (Michigan conviction for violation of 750.317 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, second degree murder, is categorically an aggravated felony murder offense for immigration purposes; under the categorical approach, a conviction for the aggravated felony of murder, as defined in INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C.
Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2012) (Connecticut conviction for witness tampering under General Statutes 53a-151 ["if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any official proceeding,"] categorically constituted an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C.
Singh v. Att'y General, 677 F.3d 503, 513 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2012) (federal conviction of knowingly making a false statement under penalty of perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 152(3), is a deceit offense, for aggravated felony purposes, where the loss attributable to the conviction is in excess of $10,000).
Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Montana conviction of felony sexual intercourse without consent, in violation of Mont.Code Ann. 45"5"503(1), knowingly have sexual intercourse without consent with a person of the opposite sex, not his spouse, was not categorically rape within the meaning of the aggravated felony rape definition, INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C.