Schaud v. Arizona. 501 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1991) (plurality opinion) (when a criminal statute provides alternative routes to a conviction, whether jurors must be unanimous with respect to a particular route depends on the answers to two questions: First, did the legislature intend to create different offenses or different means for violating a single offense?

Under Descamps and Moncrieffe, arguably no California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, is a crime of moral turpitude, because the specific intended offense is not an "element" of burglary but merely a "means" of committing the offense, since the jury need not agree unanimously as to which specific offense was intended at the time of the entry.

Matter of Kazemi, 19 I&N Dec. 49, 51 (BIA 1984) (We have long held that an application for admission to the United States is a continuing application and admissibility is determined on the basis of the law and the facts existing at the time the application is finally considered.) (emphasis added); Matter of Ching and Chen, 19 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 1984); Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992).

Rosales-Perez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 2014) (BIA properly denied petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings, since the BIA did not misapply the materiality standard where it evaluated whether the new evidence showed that a "different outcome is warranted" in petitioner's case, or abuse its discretion in finding the new evidence was not material).

Lopez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 185541 (1st Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (affirming BIAs order affirming removal order, because IJ exercised discretion in denying waivers based on extreme hardship, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4)(A), and good faith, id. 1886a(c)(4)(B), of the joint-filing requirement for removal of conditions on permanent residency, id. 1186a(c)(1)(A), so the noncitizen raised no colorable legal or constitutional claims and review is barred, so the petition is dismissed for want of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)).

Reid v. Donelan, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2014 WL 105026 (D.Mass. Jan 9, 2014) (detention under INA 236(c) is presumptively unreasonable after six months; detainees entitled to bond hearing after six months has passed).

All circuits to consider the question have held that plain language of the statutory aggravated felony bar to the waiver in INA 212(h) applies only to individuals who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents (LPR), not to those who subsequently adjusted to LPR status. Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2013); Hanif v. Atty. General of the United States, 694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 386"87 (4th Cir. 2012); Lanier v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366"67 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir.

USCIS memo dated Jan. 24, 2013 instructs officers not to find a reason to believe that the applicant may be inadmissible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i) if the offense is not a CMT, or qualifies for the petty offense or for the youthful offender exception.

Amponsah v. Holder, 709 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2013) (BIA's blanket rule against recognizing state courts' nunc pro tunc adoption decrees constitutes an impermissible construction of the term child in 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E), and thus is not due deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council , Inc., 467 U.S.

Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013) (federal violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), where the noncitizen was charged with using a social security card, knowing that card was not assigned to him and had been unlawfully obtained, to secure and maintain employment, was a crime of moral turpitude as a fraud offense).