In California burglary cases, the jury need not unanimously agree on the identity of the offense that the defendant intended to commit crime at entry. CALCRIM 1700 provides: The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or] ). You may not find the defendant guilty of burglary unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one of those crimes at the time of the entry.

If a respondent has obtained post-conviction relief in the court of conviction, respondent can ask the immigration judge or Board of Immigration Appeals sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings based upon a gross miscarriage of justice. There is a line of cases in the Ninth Circuit (Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzalez, 460 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2006); Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981); Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990)) that supports the argument that if the prior conviction was vacated on constitutional grounds, the removal was illegal and ought not to stand.

Soto v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1009 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (clock for purposes of stop-time rule for cancellation of removal ended on date NTA was served on the noncitizen, even though it was not served on the Immigration Court until two years later).

Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2013) (petitioner was not entitled to automatic derivative citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) based on his father's naturalization because his parents were never married and thus there could be no "legal separation" as required under the statute).

United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. Nov.

Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d , 886 (9th Cir. 2005) (good moral character statutory bar covers confinement in any facility"whether federal, state, or local"as a result of conviction, for the requisite period of time, falls within the meaning of [8 U.S.C.] 1101(f)(7).") (emphasis added).

NOTE: If the client received credit for time served prior to conviction, and would not otherwise be subject to the 1101(f)(7), you should preserve the argument that Arreguin-Moreno v. Mukasey, 511 F. 3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2008), and Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 1982), were wrongly decided.

Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. Dec. 9, 2013) (by agreeing in his plea agreement that the Government could have proved the factual basis for his racketeering conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, the noncitizen admitted to each of the elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, which constituted an offense related to a controlled substance; he was therefore inadmissible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)).

Hernandez v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013) (place-of-filing rule for motions to reopen, which provides that a motion to reopen must be filed with the immigration judge when the BIA dismisses an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, is only a procedural claims-processing rule and not a jurisdictional bar to the BIA's authority to consider a motion to reopen).

Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (California conviction of corporal injury of a person with a present or former listed domestic relationship, in violation of Penal Code 273.5 is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude, because the listed relationships can cover persons such as former dates, who are not protected by domestic violence laws).

Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013) (a child who has satisfied the conditions of former section INA 321(a) before turning 18 has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization).

Note that the BIA refused to follow Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d
320 (3d Cir. 2005).