Summary

In Ceron v. Holder, the BIA found petitioner deportable, holding his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of California Penal Code 245(a)(1), is a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because it is (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (II) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. The Ninth Circuit, however, granted the petition for review, and remanded to the BIA to determine in the first instance whether California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Ceron v.

The Florence project, which helps immigrants in ICE detention facilities in Florence AZ, has updated their guides to help immigrants navigate the detention facilities and address many issues. Download them for free from http://www.firrp.org/resources/prose/. Thanks to the Florence Project.

NIP-NLG and Immigrant Defense Project have written an advisory on Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2014). http://nipnlg.org/publications.htm

United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts convictions for breaking and entering (daytime or nighttime) with intent to commit a felony, M.G.L. ch. 266, 16, 18, and assault and battery with dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265, 15A, did not categorically constitute crimes of violence, under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (James and Duenas"Alvarez grants us no license to ignore actual cases on the ground that they are not typical or do not represent the majority of convictions.).

Alvarado v. Holder, 743 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. Feb. 14, 2014) (IJ applied appropriate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation, under INA 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D), in finding that respondents gifted childs heightened educational needs did not establish sufficient hardship to grant relief).

Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54, 59 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (no deference due to BIA interpretation of the aggravated felony definition statute where the BIA interpretation was inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent); citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).

Castillo v. Holder, 729 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (New Jersey disorderly persons offense is not a conviction, as defined for immigration purposes in INA 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48); Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), requires that a disposition must be considered an adjudication of guilt in a genuine criminal proceeding under the law of the convicting jurisdiction; under New Jersey law, a disorderly persons offense is not a crime).

Penal Code 186.22(d), committing a felony or misdemeanor for the benefit of a criminal street gang, is not a crime of moral turpitude. The minimum conduct sufficient to commit this offense would be committing a crime, the least serious of which would be vandalism, in violation of Penal Code 594, in association with members of a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in criminal conduct. Vandalism, aka malicious mischief, however, is not a crime of moral turpitude. Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995).

Convictions under California Health & Safety Code 11377 and 11378 do not categorically qualify as generic controlled substance offenses under settled case law.
Moreover, because the statute of conviction is not divisible in the sense used by the Supreme Court in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the Court cannot proceed to examine the record of conviction under the modified categorical analysis of the statute.