Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (a lawful permanent resident otherwise eligible for relief under former INA 212(c) is eligible without regard to whether the conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial, and without regard to whether he or she was removable or deportable under the law in effect when the conviction was entered).

United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts convictions for breaking and entering (daytime or nighttime) with intent to commit a felony, M.G.L. ch. 266, 16, 18, and assault and battery with dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265, 15A, did not categorically constitute crimes of violence, under 18 U.S.C.

Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637, 643 (BIA 2011) (very restrictive interpretation of single scheme exception for multiple moral turpitude conviction ground of deportability, calling into question the authority of older cases with a more generous interpretation: the BIA cited to Chevron and Brand X and concluded: "We respectfully conclude that our analysis there is controlling and should now be uniformly applied in all circuits throughout the country.").

Note: There is a good argument, however, to the contrary. E.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval v. U.S. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.

Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA Mar. 14, 2014) (adjustment of status constitutes an admission for purposes of determining removability under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission).

All circuits to consider the question have held that plain language of the statutory aggravated felony bar to the waiver in INA 212(h) applies only to individuals who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents (LPR), not to those who subsequently adjusted to LPR status. Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2013); Hanif v. Atty. General of the United States, 694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 386"87 (4th Cir. 2012); Lanier v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366"67 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir.

Penal Code 273.5(a) has been amended to expand the list of persons who qualify as victims of this offense. It now includes the offender's fianc or fiance, or someone with whom the offender has or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship, as defined in Penal Code 243(f)(10). In Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1-64-1065 (9th Cir.

Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2014) (immigration judge cannot consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether an alien was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude: We have long held that, in making this determination, judges may consider only the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute, or, in the case of divisible statutes, the alien's record of conviction. Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546, 548 (1952).

United States v. Tucker, 740 F.3d 1177 (8th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014) (under the Supreme Courts decision in Descamps, the court may not apply the modified categorical approach to a statute that is textually indivisible, such as the Missouri statute penalizing a walk-away escape from a half-way house, to hold the offense to be a crime of violence under the residual otherwise clause of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), because there was a guard on duty when the escape occurred); partially overruling United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.

Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014) (the aggravated felony bar to a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h) for a noncitizen previously admitted to the US as a LPR does not apply to someone who adjusted status without leaving the United States: only non-citizens who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents are barred from eligibility to apply for waiver).

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (mandatory immigration detention pursuant to INA 236(c) detention is limited to six months; anything longer without an individualized hearing is presumptively unreasonable); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (individualized hearing required to determine what is reasonable in a given case); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003); Bourguignon v. MacDonald, 667 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Mass. 2009).