Rodriguez-Valencia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2899605 (9th Cir. Jul. 21, 2011) (per curiam) (California offense of willfully manufacturing, intentionally selling, and knowingly possessing for sale more than 1,000 articles bearing a counterfeit trademark, in violation of Penal Code 350(a)(2), has intent to defraud as an element); see Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1117, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.2008) (California Penal Code 350 is an inherently fraudulent crime.).

Texas law conflicts with federal immigration law as to whether deferred adjudication constitutes a conviction. Ex parte Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Deferred adjudication is not a conviction.). But see Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 230 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that deferred adjudication in Texas constitutes a conviction for purposes of immigration law).

Planes v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2619105 (9th Cir. Jul.5, 2011) (Accordingly, we conclude that the first definition of conviction in 1101(a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.); accord, Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir.2007) (IIRIRA did, however, eliminate the requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived before a conviction is considered final under the statute.); Moosa v.

Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1294, 2011 WL 2547562 (10th Cir. Jun. 28, 2011) (Pending post-conviction motions or other collateral attacks do not negate the finality of a conviction for immigration purposes unless and until the conviction is overturned.); see Paredes v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198"99 (3d Cir.2008) (adopting the reasoning of sister circuits and holding that the pendency of collateral proceedings does not vitiate finality).

There is some tension between the rule that the original sentence is added to probation-violation sentences, on the one hand, and the Song/Cota BIA cases on sentence modification that state that it is the final sentence that governs for purposes of assessing the immigration consequences of a judgment. Matter of Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2001); Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849 (BIA 2005).

INA 101(a)(48)(A) (statutory definition of conviction); United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that a one-year sentence on a violation of probation was a separate conviction from the conviction for the underlying offense, and holding that the probation violation did not make the underlying offense a crime of violence aggravated felony: "the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment following revocation of probation [in NY] is a modification of the original sentence"); In re Ahmed, 2005 WL 3952705 (Aug.

Active concealment, whether physical or verbal, is required for the elements [of misprision of a felony] to be established. See Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 U.S.C. 4: An Exploration of the Federal Misprision of Felony Statute, 55 ALA. L. REV. 183, 185"86 (2003) (explaining the dichotomy between physical and verbal concealment, and noting the heightened standard for verbal concealment to include cases such as knowingly providing the police with completely false information); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S.

Mendez-Mendez v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2008) (the plain language of the phrase, maximum penalty possible in INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), refers to the statutory maximum, not the guideline range, so noncitizen was ineligible for the petty offense exception to inadmissibility for one CMT conviction, under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. (a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)).

Note: This result is different under state sentencing statutes that prohibit a sentence in excess of one year for a given offense, criminal history, or other circumstances. United States v.

Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 2011 WL 2464779 (10th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011)(conviction is considered final for immigration purposes as soon as formal judgment of guilt was entered by trial court; government need not show by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction was legally valid as prerequisite to using conviction as basis for deportation: In determining whether a conviction supports removal, [i]mmigration authorities must look solely to the judicial record of final conviction and may not make their own independent assessment of the validity of [the alien's] guilty plea....

Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 2011 WL 2464779 (10th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011)(conviction was final for immigration purposes as soon as formal judgment of guilt was entered by trial court, and the pendency of the state court proceedings challenging validity of guilty plea on Sixth Amendment grounds did not make conviction nonfinal for immigration purposes).