Ponta-Garcia v. Attorney General of U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 415560 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2009) (regulation authorizing immigration officers, rather than immigration judges, to reinstate prior removal orders was a reasonable construction of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5); "While this language prohibits relitigation of the merits of the original order of removal, it does not prohibit an examination of whether the original order was invalidated, or preclude judicial review of whether ICE met its obligations in making the reinstatement determination."), following Morales-Izquierdo v.

Ponta-Garcia v. Attorney General of U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 415560 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2009) (holding regulation and statute, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), governing reinstatement of removal orders do not violate due process); accord, Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 495-98 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) ("Given the narrow and mechanical determinations immigration officers must make and the procedural safeguards provided by [the regulations], the risk of erroneous deprivation is extremely low....

Chambers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 2009 WL 63882 (Jan. 13, 2009) (Illinois conviction of "knowingly fail[ing] to report" for periodic imprisonment "to the Jefferson County Jail, a penal institution", in violation of Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, 5/31-6(a), did not categorically constitute a "violent felony" for purposes of applying the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory prison term enhancement of sentence for a conviction of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (canon to construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubt dictates that a court should avoid interpretations that would create doubt about the constitutional validity of a statute).

United States v. Hayes, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 2009) ("We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.").

United States v. Hayes, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 2009) ("'[T]he touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.' Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the rule 'only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.' United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994).

8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (Attorney General has the authority both to direct that the BIA refer cases to him for decision and to vacate and reconsider any previous Attorney General decision); Matter of RA, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) (vacating stay order issued by previous Attorney General); see also 8 U.S.C. 103(g) (Attorney General shall review administrative determinations in immigration proceedings as necessary for carrying out his duties).

Mejia-Rodriguez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 456386 (1st Cir. Feb. 25, 2009) (for purposes of eligibility for the petty offense exception to inadmissibility, under INA 212(a)(2)(A) (ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), the term "maximum penalty possible" is defined as the statutory range of imprisonment and not the federal Sentencing Guidelines range), following Mendez-Mendez v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 828, 832-35 (9th Cir. 2008).

Guam and Northern Mariana Islands added to VWP.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cnmi_ifr_2009-01-13.pdf

Guam and Northern Mariana Islands added to VWP.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cnmi_ifr_2009-01-13.pdf