Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) ("As a threshold matter, we note that Mr. Ghani did not raise this claim before the BIA; therefore, the issue is waived. See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 n. 14 (7th Cir.2005) (arguments not raised to the BIA are waived for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).").

Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (IIRAIRA bar to cancellation of removal properly applied retroactively to visa fraud conviction occurring before IIRAIRA effective date).

Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) (BIA erred in finding that nonimmigrant had failed to make application for INA 212(d)(3) waiver, as opposed to INA 212(i), where both waivers require the same form, the I-601, and that form does not allow the applicant to specify which form of relief is being sought).

Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) (nonimmigrant paroled into the United States for purposes of inadmissibility proceedings is not barred from making an application for a waiver under INA 212(d)(3); "At oral argument the government relied heavily on the BIA's decision in Matter of Fueyo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 84 (BIA 1989), to support its argument that it is too late now that removal proceedings are underway for Atunnise to apply for a 212(d)(3) waiver.

Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) ("under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947), the government may not defend the agency's ruling on a ground that is not articulated-or at least discernable-in the decision itself. See Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir.2007); Gebreeyesus v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir.2007); Mengistu v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1044, 1046-47 (7th Cir.2004).").

Omari v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 531688 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (noncitizen failed to exhaust administrative remedies on four issues, rejecting argument that he effectively -- if not explicitly -- raised the issues before the BIA, giving the BIA notice adequate to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, because allowance of "effective" exhaustion runs contrary to the purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1252(d).)

Omari v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 531688 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (court of appeal has no authority to excuse failure to comply with statutory jurisdictional requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies), following Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2364-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

Muka v. Baker, 559 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2009) (REAL ID Act deprived district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging orders of removal; no Suspension Clause violation).

United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2009) ("In the context of a conviction stemming from a guilty plea-as Medina-Almaguer's predeportation conviction did-the question is whether the court documents establish that the defendant "necessarily admitted" the elements of a predicate offense through his plea. Id. at 16; see also id. at 20-21, 26; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.

Matter of Louissaint, 24 I. & N. Dec. 754 (BIA Mar. 18, 2009) (categorical approach for determining if a particular crime involves moral turpitude set forth in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), requires the traditional categorical analysis, which was used by the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), and includes an inquiry into whether there is a "realistic probability" that the statute under which the alien was convicted would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude).