Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (en banc) (no deference owed to the BIAs definition of "crime of moral turpitude.")
NOTE: Here the Ninth Circuit declines to give deference to the Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (A.G. 2008) ("[a] reprehensible act with some form of scienter."). Instead the Ninth Circuit continues to consider CMT to be of two types: "those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.");Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005); Navarro-Lopez v.
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (en banc) (Chevron deference applies to the ultimate determination of whether an offense, once established, meets the CMT definition; deference is due to the BIAs assessment of "the character, gravity and moral significance of the conduct" as the BIA "draw[s] upon all its expertise as the single body charged with adjudicating all federal immigration cases."), overruling Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 744-745 (9th Cir. 2008); Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 922, 997 (9th Cir.
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (en banc) (unpublished BIA decisions are generally given Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) deference BIA, which depends upon the persuasive value of the decision, unless the decision relies upon a published decision, in which case full Chevron deference is accorded).
Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) (a K-visa [fiancee visa] is a nonimmigrant visa; nonimmigrant is ineligible for a waiver under INA 212(i), which applies only to intending immigrants; rejecting argument that K-visa is really an immigrant visa since all K-visa recipients intend to immigrate to the U.S.).
Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 03, 2009) (per curiam) (use of pre-IIRAIRA conviction to create bar to cancellation of removal under the stop-time rule is not impermissibly retroactive).
Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2009) (federal conviction for making a false statement to an officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; "Even if the conduct for which Mr. Ghani was convicted did not rise to the level of fraud, however, his conviction necessarily establishes that he knowingly and willfully lied to the Government of the United States about a material matter.") NOTE: In the Seventh Circuit, Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008) applied Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec.
Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. Mar. 26, 2009) (noncitizen who obtained LPR status by fraud is not eligible for cancellation of removal f under INA 240A(a)).
Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) (nonimmigrant paroled into the United States for purposes of inadmissibility proceedings is not barred from making an application for a waiver under INA 212(d)(3); "At oral argument the government relied heavily on the BIA's decision in Matter of Fueyo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 84 (BIA 1989), to support its argument that it is too late now that removal proceedings are underway for Atunnise to apply for a 212(d)(3) waiver.
Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2008) ("under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947), the government may not defend the agency's ruling on a ground that is not articulated-or at least discernable-in the decision itself. See Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir.2007); Gebreeyesus v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir.2007); Mengistu v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1044, 1046-47 (7th Cir.2004).").
Omari v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 531688 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (noncitizen failed to exhaust administrative remedies on four issues, rejecting argument that he effectively -- if not explicitly -- raised the issues before the BIA, giving the BIA notice adequate to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, because allowance of "effective" exhaustion runs contrary to the purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1252(d).)