United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Where a discrepancy arises between the terms of an oral pronouncement of a sentence and the subsequent written judgment, the terms of the oral pronouncement control. United States v. Bergmann, 836 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988).").

United States v. Bergmann, 836 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988) (oral pronouncement at sentencing hearing constituted legal sentence, not words reduced to writing in judgment and commitment order, and remand was necessary for evidentiary hearing to determine whether sentencing transcript was in error in stating that defendant's sentences were concurrent rather than consecutive), citing 28 U.S.C. 753(b) ("The transcript in any case certified by the reporter ... shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the testimony taken and proceedings had.").

United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The only sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant."); See United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1451-52 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (the words pronounced by the judge at sentencing, not the words reduced to writing in the judge's Judgment/Commitment Order, constitutes the legal sentence).

Liu v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2009) (BIA denial of motion for reconsideration proper where moving party failed to specify a particular error of law or fact in that earlier decision).

Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2009) (BIA decision did not sufficiently explain why it designated the U.K. as the a country of removal, where petitioner was in the U.K. for only a few hours during a stopover en route to the U.S. and had no legal right to live or travel there).

Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 2009) (court lacks jurisdiction to review BIA refusal to grant sua sponte motion to reopen, since there are no meaningful standards by which to evaluate the decision).

Iqbal v. Bryson, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (E.D. Va., Jan. 13, 2009) ("Had Petitioner been required to plead guilty or admit to facts surrounding the charges, New York's PDA and Texas' deferred adjudication program would be identical when analyzed under the statute. Instead of utilizing New York's deferred adjudication agreement, which does require the defendant to make a plea, Petitioner was involved in New York's PDA program, which has no such requirements.

Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) (BIA erred in looking to record of conviction to determine the underlying felony in a conviction for misprision of a felony, since the statute at issue, 8 U.S.C. 4, does not include any discrete subsections or disjunctive terms).

Valencia v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2008) (immigration judge is not required to advise noncitizen of availability of relief from removal where there is no apparent eligibility for the relief; there is no blanket requirement that an IJ must advise respondent of possibility of receiving asylum, withholding or CAT).

United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 452-453 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) (In California, "[a] guilty plea admits every element of the crime charged." People v. Wallace 33 Cal.4th 738, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 93 P.3d 1037, 1043 (2004) (quotations omitted). Based on Wallace,one might argue that Moreno-Florean's guilty plea admitted every conjunctive element alleged in the indictment.