Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. January 14, 2008) (immigration judge violates due process by making up mind before conclusion of removal hearing), citing Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding violation of procedural due process where IJ first made up his mind about noncitizen's claims and refused to listen to testimony).

Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (New York conviction of grand larceny in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Section 155.30 of the New York Penal Law, a Class E felony, constituted a conviction, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for deportation purposes under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) (Illinois conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), constituted an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) ("[t]he term aggravated felony means ... an offense described in ... section 922(g)(1) ... of Title 18 (relating to firearms offenses).", despite the fact that the Illinois offense lacks the interstate commerce element of the analogous federal offense), following United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete is arguing that defined in and described in are synonymous. We reject this argument, primarily because it renders the distinction between the terms described in and defined in meaningless. See United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1995). Also, it does not follow that, because Congress has defined some crimes in general terms, it had to define all crimes in general terms in order for the offense's state law counterpart to be included within the definition of an aggravated felony.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete is arguing that defined in and described in are synonymous. We reject this argument, primarily because it renders the distinction between the terms described in and defined in meaningless. See United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1995). Also, it does not follow that, because Congress has defined some crimes in general terms, it had to define all crimes in general terms in order for the offense's state law counterpart to be included within the definition of an aggravated felony.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete contends that, even if we accept the Board's interpretation of 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) in Vasquez-Muniz II, the application of that interpretation to his case had an impermissible retroactive effect and therefore violated his due process rights. Negrete asserts that such a change in interpretation must take place through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than through adjudication. We find Negrete's retroactivity argument unpersuasive.

Matter of SK, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475 (BIA Mar. 11, 2008) (Attorney Generals remand in Matter of SK, 24 I. & N. Dec. 289 (A.G. 2007), does not affect the
precedential nature of the conclusions of the Board of Immigration Appeals
in Matter of SK, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (BIA 2006), regarding the applicability
and interpretation of the material support provisions in INA 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)).

United States v. Crampton, 519 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (Oregon conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, in violation of ORS 166.272(a), is a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, because of the substantial risk of force).

United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (Colorado conviction for assault two (drugging a victim), in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18-3-203(1)(e) (2001), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since drugging by surreptitious means does not involve the use of physical force).

Immigration counsel can argue that reversal of a removal order is required when an immigration judge plays an improper prosecutorial role in the proceedings. When the judge abandons his role as an unbiased arbiter of fact and law, and becomes a prosecutor, the court contravenes its responsibilities as a neutral fact finder. It is well settled that a judge must remain neutral. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (hearing officers serving in a quasi-judicial capacity must meet the due process demand of impartiality).