United States v. Crampton, 519 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (Oregon conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, in violation of ORS 166.272(a), is a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, because of the substantial risk of force).

United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (Colorado conviction for assault two (drugging a victim), in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18-3-203(1)(e) (2001), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since drugging by surreptitious means does not involve the use of physical force).

Immigration counsel can argue that reversal of a removal order is required when an immigration judge plays an improper prosecutorial role in the proceedings. When the judge abandons his role as an unbiased arbiter of fact and law, and becomes a prosecutor, the court contravenes its responsibilities as a neutral fact finder. It is well settled that a judge must remain neutral. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (hearing officers serving in a quasi-judicial capacity must meet the due process demand of impartiality).

See Federal Rules of Evidence 902; 18 U.S.C. 3505.

A JRAD prevents deportation on account of an aggravated felony. Nguyen v. Chertoff, 501 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2007); Probert v. United States, 737 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (JRAD available to offender whose aggravated felony controlled substance conviction was on appeal, since only thirty days were allowed within which to seek a JRAD, and by not limiting JRADs only to crimes of moral turpitude, Congress intended court to have an opportunity to determine which aggravated felonies should be the basis for deportation).

Matter of Bires-Larios, 24 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA Mar. 10, 2008) (a child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former INA 321(a) (1988) is a United States Citizen, even if the divorced, naturalized parent obtained legal custody of the child after the parent naturalized).

United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 512 n.2 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (the term "sexual abuse of a minor" has the same meaning in the aggravated felony context as in the illegal re-entry sentencing context).

United States v. Murillo, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2008 WL 697160 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2008) (a "social security card" does not constitute a "means of identification" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1546(b) and 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b), so the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss Count 3); United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (a "social security card" is not a "means of identification" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1546(b), even if this creates a "loophole" or appears inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. 1546(a)).

RELIEF - 212(H) WAIVER - 30 GRAM MARIJUANA EXCEPTION - DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Escobar-Barraza v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2008) (noncitizen qualified for a waiver of inadmissibility, under INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), on account of a controlled substances conviction, since his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia related to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana).

Toledo-Hernandez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008) ("[I]f the BIA has never been given the opportunity to consider an issue but has the mechanisms to remedy it, even where the 90-day period for presenting a motion to reopen has passed, a petitioner must first present the issue to the Board in the form of a motion to reopen for exceptional circumstances. Toledo does not dispute that he has not raised the issue of his vacated convictions before the BIA, nor does he contend that the BIA has inadequate mechanisms to address and remedy his claim.