Nijhawan v. Attorney General, 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. May 2, 2008) (federal conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, constituted a fraud offense aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, ___ (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008) ("And to avoid repetition of the same mistakes the third time around, we urge the agency to refer this case to a different immigration judge."), citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004).

Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008) (all noncitizens, including people without documentation, enjoy due process rights in removal proceedings: "Aliens in the United States, no matter their immigration status, are entitled to due process. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Kerciku v. I.N.S., 314 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, they are protected against arbitrary government action that "shocks the conscience" and cannot be justified by any government interest. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998); United States v.

Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. January 14, 2008) (immigration judge violates due process by making up mind before conclusion of removal hearing), citing Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding violation of procedural due process where IJ first made up his mind about noncitizen's claims and refused to listen to testimony).

Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (New York conviction of grand larceny in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Section 155.30 of the New York Penal Law, a Class E felony, constituted a conviction, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for deportation purposes under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) (Illinois conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), constituted an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) ("[t]he term aggravated felony means ... an offense described in ... section 922(g)(1) ... of Title 18 (relating to firearms offenses).", despite the fact that the Illinois offense lacks the interstate commerce element of the analogous federal offense), following United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete is arguing that defined in and described in are synonymous. We reject this argument, primarily because it renders the distinction between the terms described in and defined in meaningless. See United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1995). Also, it does not follow that, because Congress has defined some crimes in general terms, it had to define all crimes in general terms in order for the offense's state law counterpart to be included within the definition of an aggravated felony.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete is arguing that defined in and described in are synonymous. We reject this argument, primarily because it renders the distinction between the terms described in and defined in meaningless. See United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1995). Also, it does not follow that, because Congress has defined some crimes in general terms, it had to define all crimes in general terms in order for the offense's state law counterpart to be included within the definition of an aggravated felony.

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete contends that, even if we accept the Board's interpretation of 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) in Vasquez-Muniz II, the application of that interpretation to his case had an impermissible retroactive effect and therefore violated his due process rights. Negrete asserts that such a change in interpretation must take place through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than through adjudication. We find Negrete's retroactivity argument unpersuasive.

Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) (California conviction of providing false identification to a police officer, in violation of Penal Code 148.9(a), is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, under INA 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), because the offense does not require fraudulent intent under California law).