United States v. Orellana, ___ F.3d ___ , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5436 (5th Cir. April 5, 2005) ("Because we conclude that it is uncertain whether Congress intended to criminalize the possession of firearms by aliens in receipt of lawful temporary protected status, we apply the rule of lenity and reverse.").  

It is possible to argue that a deferred prosecution agreement does not constitute a conviction under the IIRAIRA statutory definition of conviction for immigration purposes, provided the court does not order any restraint of the defendant during the deferred-prosecution period, but merely approves the agreement between the parties. Thanks to Jennifer Foster for this argument.

The difference between a plea of no contest, or nolo contendere, and a guilty plea is chiefly that the no contest plea may not be used against the defendant in civil proceedings, whereas the guilty plea can. There is no difference between the two pleas insofar as the criminal proceedings are concerned. Therefore, when a defendant is allowed to enter a no contest plea in criminal proceedings, s/he is typically informed that the plea may not be used against him or her in civil proceedings. Immigration proceedings are civil, not criminal, proceedings.

Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services
[Local Address]      FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

Re: Name and A-number   
Gentlepersons:
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, request is hereby made for a copy each and every serial in the above captioned individual's A-file.  A G-28 signed by CLIENT is enclosed.
Thank you for your prompt attention.
Sincerely,
Attorney

Advocates can argue the immigration court should apply the definition of "child abuse or child neglect" that is now in INA 214(d)(3) (added by the VAWA reauthorization Act, as of 1/06) to INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i). This definition of child neglect requires "an imminent risk of serious harm" which is a much higher standard than some state statutes. INA 214(d)(3) incorporates the definition "for purposes of this subsection."

United States v. Maswai, 419 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1367(a) restricts the use of immigration information furnished by a battering spouse in making a determination of admissibility or excludability but does not apply to exclude immigration evidence in a criminal proceeding).

United States v. Nobriga, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 20, 2005) (per curiam) (Hawaii conviction of abuse of a family or household member, in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 709-906(A), did not constitute a conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, under 18 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the use of the ordinary meaning of the language of a statute defining a ground of deportation. The domestic violence deportation ground requires that the noncitizen must have been "convicted of a crime of domestic violence," INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)(emphasis supplied), before this ground of deportation is triggered.

The ordinary meaning of "illicit trafficking" in a controlled substance does not include simple possession. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (Supreme Court uses "ordinary meaning" approach to conclude that accidental injury does not fall within ordinary meaning of "crime of violence" aggravated felony definition: "In construing both parts of 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term crime of violence.

Jaggerneuth v. U.S. Atty General, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 3454321 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2005) (Florida conviction of grand theft, in violation of Fla. Stat. 812.014(1)(2001), did not constitute aggravated felony theft, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, because the statute was divisible as subsection (b) required only intent to appropriate use of the property, and the record of conviction did not establish that the defendant was convicted under subsection (a)).