United States v. Melendez-Torres, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 2037351 (1st Cir. August 25, 2005) (court of appeal lacked jurisdiction to review claim that district judge erred in failing to depart downward based on cultural assimilation).

Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA 1999) ("[I]t is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing or hindering one's own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").

A conviction of coercing labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1589, does not constitute an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(K)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii), which lists only neighboring provisions. This offense appears to be divisible with respect to whether it constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsections (1) and (2) appear would be crimes of moral turpitude if committed by means of threats of serious harm to a person, at least if construed as serious bodily harm.

There could arguably be offenses relating to the "attempted promotion" of prostitution that dont come under 101(a)(43)(K)(i)which deploys 4 verbs:  "owning, controlling, managing or supervising of a prostitution business." Those are specific verbs, seemingly aimed at the top end of the enterprise. Not everyone who has ever been involved with the prostitution business has "owned, controlled," etc; so there might be a statutory argument that an offense such as employment at a house of prostitution (i.e.

Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. Nov. 19. 2004) (conviction of making a false statement to a United States official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, is divisible with respect to the fraud offense aggravated felony defined in INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since it does not require proof of any monetary loss and so does not automatically satisfy the element of this aggravated felony definition requiring a loss to the victim(s) in excess of $10,000, so the record of conviction must be examined to determine whether the conviction falls within the definition).

Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. Nov. 19. 2004) (conviction of making a false claim against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 287, is divisible with respect to the fraud offense aggravated felony defined in INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. Nov. 19. 2004) (conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, is divisible with respect to the fraud offense aggravated felony defined in INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since it does not require proof of any monetary loss and so does not automatically satisfy the element of this aggravated felony definition requiring a loss to the victim(s) in excess of $10,000, so the record of conviction must be examined to determine whether the conviction falls within the definition).

United States v. Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 2036247 (8th Cir. Aug. 25, 2005) (waiver of appeal in immigration court of prior deportation order by defendant was not rendered unknowing and unintelligent based upon immigration judge's incorrect prediction of whether the appellate court would consider underlying drunk driving offense to be an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes, so defendant could not collaterally attack validity of prior deportation order as a defense to illegal reentry prosecution).

United States v. Rodriguez, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. Aug. 25, 2005) (Defendant may not collaterally attack a prior deportation order since he knowingly waived his right to appeal the immigration judge's decision and was not deprived of a right to judicial review).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/044178p.pdf

Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2005) (federal conviction of bank fraud, in violation of under 18 U.S.C. 1344, did not constitute aggravated felony fraud offense under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C.