Valencia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 12, 2005) (California conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18, in violation of Penal Code 261.5(c), with a five-year suspended sentence, did not have as an element the use or threat of force, and so did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), or triggered removal under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).

Valencia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 12, 2005) (California conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18 (here 17), in violation of Penal Code 261.5(c), with a five year suspended sentence, constituted a crime of violence aggravated felony under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), and therefore triggered removal under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), following United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.

United States v. Remoi, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 845884 (3d Cir.

United States v. Alfaro, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 976995 (5th Cir. April 28, 2005) (Virginia conviction of shooting into an occupied dwelling, in violation of Va.Code Ann. 18.202-79 (1993), did not constitute a crime of violence for purposes of enhancing his sentence for illegal reentry by sixteen levels under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 3196524 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2005) (aggravated battery under 784.045 of the Florida Statutes is a divisible statute, as the statute may be committed by any assault on a pregnant woman, including spitting, which does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and therefore may not be an aggravated felony crime of violence for sentencing purposes).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0440173cr0p.pdf

Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 3047411 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (Texas conviction of assault, in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.01(a)(3) ("intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative"), did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since "offensive or provocative contact" does not necessarily involve the use of physical force).

There is an argument that regardless of any latent ambiguity in the phrase "any felony" in 924(c)(2), under Jerome v. U.S., 318 U.S. 101 (1943), 1101(a)(43)(B) covers only convictions, whether obtained under federal or state law, which would be felonies under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2). In Jerome v. U.S., the issue was the meaning of the phrase "any felony" in a federal criminal statute. As the Court held therein, 318 U.S. at 101-2 (internal citations omitted): Sec. 2 (a) of the Bank Robbery Act ...

United States v. Kelly, 422 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2005) (Washington State conviction for attempting to elude a police vehicle, in violation of RCW 46.61.024, is not a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0430074p.pdf

Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. Aug. 11, 2005) (vehicular homicide under New Jersey Statutes 2C:11-5, is not a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16, since the statue requires only a reckless intent)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/034143p.pdf

United States v. Lopez-Montanez, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4, is not a categorical crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the offense is not necessarily a "forcible" sex offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(ii)). Compare Lisbey v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4 constitutes an aggravated felony for removal purposes, as the offense involves a substantial risk of physical force under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)).