Ng v. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 278879 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2006) (federal conviction of use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1958, constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

California conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, or by force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1), is arguably not a crime of violence aggravated felony because California law allows conviction for "negligent assault." People v. Wright, 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 710-724 (2002). Conviction of this offense, therefore, cannot constitute a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377, 382 (2004), which held that the mens rea necessary for a crime of violence aggravated felony must be more than mere negligence.

Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (4th Cir. July 5, 2005) (Virginia conviction for simple involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-36 (2004), which requires the killing of a person as a proximate result of the defendant's reckless disregard for human life, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Perez-Vargas, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 2005) (Colorado conviction for third-degree assault, "knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon," in violation of C.R.S.

Popal v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1791998 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania Penal Code 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence). Following Tran v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1620320 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005).

Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (state statute of conviction must require at least the same level of scienter as the relevant federal statute in order for the state conviction to constitute an aggravated felony).

The ordinary meaning of "alien smuggling" does not include transportation of noncitizens within the United States, but requires a border be crossed. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (Supreme Court uses "ordinary meaning" approach to conclude that accidental injury does not fall within ordinary meaning of "crime of violence" aggravated felony definition: "In construing both parts of 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term crime of violence.

Parrilla v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1606506 (July 11, 2005) (even if Washington offense of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes constituted attempt, within the meaning of the aggravated felony definition, INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), the substantive offense did not categorically constitute sexual abuse of a minor, so the presumed attempt likewise did not constitute an aggravated felony).

United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2006) (Washington conviction of second-degree burglary, under Wash. Rev. Code 9A.52.030(1) ["A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling."], held to constitute crime of violence for purposes of imposing a 16-level increase in base offense level under U.S.S.G.

Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2005) (New York conviction for "use of a child in a sexual performance" under New York Penal Law ("N.Y.P.L.") 263.05, did not constitute an offense relating to child pornography, and was therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(I), 8 U.S.C.