Alonzo v. Lynch,___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1612772 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) (Iowa convictions for domestic abuse assault, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Iowa Code Annotated 708.1, a divisible statute, did not categorically constitute crimes of moral turpitude, since a single conviction of that offense is not necessarily a crime of moral turpitude). See Cisneros"Guerrerro v. Holder, 774 F.3d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 2014).

Note: The court noted, but made no decision on, the issue of whether conviction of multiple non-CMT offenses can arise to the level of a CMT.

Alonzo v. Lynch,___ F.3d ___, ___, 2016 WL 1612772 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) ([T]he BIA and various courts have declined to classify [simple assault] as a [CIMT]. Simple assault typically is a general intent crime, and it is thus different in character from those offenses that involve a vicious motive, corrupt mind, or evil intent. Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 814"15 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Matter of O, 3 I. & N. Dec. 193, 194"95 (BIA 1948)); see also [Matter of] Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (same).).

Sauceda v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___ (1st Cir. Apr.

Matter of Chairez and Sama, 26 I. & N. Dec. 686 (A.G. 2015) (referred to Atty Gen. for review of issues relating to the application of Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013); ordering cases stayed and not regarded as precedential during pendency of review).

Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015) (Nevada conviction for conspiracy to possess credit card without cardholder's consent, in violation of NRSA 199.480, 205.690(2) (possess[ion of] a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder and with the intent to circulate, use, sell or transfer the credit card or debit card with the intent to defraud.), required intent to defraud and was therefore a crime involving moral turpitude); see Matter of Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec.

Under Johnson, the Term Crime Involving Moral Turpitude
Is Void for Vagueness.

Several months ago, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because the reasons that led the Supreme Court to strike down that provision are just as present"if not more so"in the CIMT statute, the Court must apply Johnson to find that INA [ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)/ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)] is also void for vagueness.

Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015) (California conviction of possession of child pornography, Penal Code 311.11(a), is not a divisible statute, since the jury is not required to find the exact nature of the sexual activity portrayed, so no resort may be had to the modified categorical analysis to determine whether the conviction qualified as a child pornography aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(I)).

Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 667 (BIA 2015) (where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the aliens continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.

De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015) (a ruling from the BIA which interprets an ambiguous statute, and which overrules prior circuit court precedent under Brand X, should be presumed to act prospectively only).

Mocoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015) (respondent did not continue to accrue continuous physical presence, for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal, after being served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings that did not contain the date and time of appearance); see Matter of Camarrillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011).