Ruiz-Vidal v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) (immigration court could look to originally charged count to identify controlled substance where noncitizen pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense; Ruiz"Vidal's plea"which references a specific count in the Information"and the Information, which references a specific controlled substance, provide clear and convincing evidence that Ruiz"Vidal was convicted of a removable offense.).

NOTE: This case does not necessarily apply to all pleas to lesser included offenses.

Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 2015) (noncitizen had burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish he had not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, even though Maine courts do not maintain records sufficient to show whether he was convicted under the bodily injury prong of the Maine statute, rather than the general assault prong, which does not involve sufficient violence).

NOTE: This case has been reversed on rehearing by Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (1st Cir. Apr.

This practice advisory and a link discuss state by state post-conviction relief statutes. http://www.adminrelief.org/resources/item.566101-Post_Conviction_Relief_...
They are also on the www.adminrelief.org website.

Mowlana v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 5730791 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (in determining whether a federal conviction categorically qualifies as a ground of removal, the realistic probability inquiry applies just as when analyzing a state-law offense); following Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1055"57 (8th Cir.2012); see Rios"Diaz v. Holder, 543 F. App'x 617, 618 (8th Cir.2013); see also Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App'x 55, 57 (2d Cir.2014); Familia Rosario v. Holder, 655 F.3d 739, 749 (7th Cir. 2011); Accardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 634 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2011).

Morales v Gonzales, 478 F3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (a defendants admission to facts for a limited purpose does not become part of the record of conviction and cannot be used in subsequent proceedings).

Note: Facts recited by a court of appeals opinion affirming the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction were not facts admitted by the defendant for their truth and should not have been considered part of the record of conviction for purposes of determining the nature of the conviction for immigration purposes.

She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2010) ([W]e lack the clairvoyance necessary to confidently infer the reasoning behind the BIAs conclusion [ ] " reversing BIA for lack of clarity in reason for decision).

Pina-Galindo v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 2015) (per curiam) (non-LPR cancellation criminal bar includes inadmissibility INA 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) [multiple convictions with sentences totaling five years or more]).

Pena v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2015) (Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider alien's petition for review of expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), 1252(a)(2)(D), (e)).

By Norton Tooby

Inadmissibility for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, which constitutes a violent or dangerous offense, cannot be waived under INA 212(h) absent exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or national security reasons. 8 CFR 1212.7(d). See discussion of same standard in Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (AG 2002). See also N. TOOBY & J.J. ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS 24.29 (2012).

A May 27, 2003 USCIS memorandum clarified that the applicable hardship standard under 8 C.F.R.

Velazquez-Herrera v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (BIA dictum is not a statutory interpretation that carries the force of law, and thus is not entitled to deference); cf. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (a holding, as opposed to dicta, is reached after reasoned consideration, in which the court undeniably decided the issue, after argument from both parties).