Palma-Martinez v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. May 11, 2015) (nunc pro tunc waivers under INA 212(h) are not available on a stand alone basis; petition must be filed in conjunction with application for adjustment of status).

Maldonado v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2343051 (9th Cir. May 18, 2015) (the petition for review was not moot notwithstanding petitioners removal after filing his petition for review, because there was solid evidence that the petitioner was currently present in the United States, seeking relief from removal to Mexico to avoid being killed, and thus continues to have a stake in the outcome of the petition for review).

Maldonado v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 2343051 (9th Cir. May 18, 2015) (the petition for review did not warrant discretionary dismissal under the equitable fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which applies where a petitioner has fled custody and cannot be located when their appeals come before this court, since in this case, the petitioner is not a fugitive because he did not flee. He complied with his deportation order and was removed to Mexico.).

Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015) (BIA was not required to apply categorical analysis to determine whether a conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of application of the enhanced hardship standard under Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (Att'y Gen. 2002); immigration judge was allowed to examine documents outside the record of conviction in making the determination whether a conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime).

Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015) (determination whether conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of considering an application for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h), is a discretionary decision not subject to review).

Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015)
(California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), constituted a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of triggering application of the Matter or Jean enhanced hardship standard to an application for a waiver of moral turpitude inadmissibility under INA 212(h)).

The Supreme Court commented, in dictum, that a residential burglary conviction, with a one-year sentence imposed, would qualify as an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). It stated: The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004).

Almaza Arenas (overruling Young v. Holder) was vacated. It's going en banc. Many of you may be aware of this already, but if not--here it is. Now arguably, Moncrieffe still trumps Young v. Holder on the burden issue (for affirmative applications for relief), but this makes our advisory world much more challenging when advising undocumented clients.

Walker v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1782677 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015) (Florida conviction of uttering a forged instrument, under Fla. Stat. 831.02, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i): Because uttering a forged instrument involves deceit, we hold that it is a crime of moral turpitude. Uttering a forged instrument is behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.); quoting and following Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002).

Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550 (A.G. Apr. 10, 2015) (immigration adjudicators are no longer allowed to go outside the record of conviction to determine whether a conviction constitutes a crime of moral turpitude), vacating 24 I & N Dec 687 (A.G.