Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84, 88, n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2009) ("Collateral attack [on conviction in immigration proceedings] may be permissible in rare circumstances such as where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), see, e.g., Drakes, 330 F.3d at 605, but no such error is alleged here.").

United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez, __F.3d __ (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2009) (police report could not be examined to determine if prior conviction involved sale of cocaine).

Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2009) (five-year statute of limitations on rescission of LPR status, found in 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), does not apply to noncitizen in removal proceedings and did not bar the government from initiating removal proceedings based on petitioners' fraud in their asylum applications).

Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2009) (status as a former asylee granted LPR status does not prevent DHS from initiating removal proceedings based on fraud at the time asylum was granted).

United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. Aug. 25th 2009) (conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA) is affirmed where an individual's obligation to register is not dependent on a state's implementation of SORNA; irrelevant that Washington State had not implemented SORNA at the time of defendant's conviction).

S-Yong v. Holder, 578 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2009) (IJ decision reversed where record contained no criminal documentation to show that noncitizens conviction under California Health & Safety Code 11378 involved a federally listed controlled substance).

Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2009) (per curiam) (the phrase "lawfully resided continuously" used in INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), is ambiguous, and the BIA's interpretation is reasonable, so the court of appeals grants Chevron deference to its conclusion that respondent "did not lawfully reside in the United States during those periods in which he was an applicant for asylum or for adjustment of status and lacked any other basis for claiming lawful residence."), affirming In re Rotimi, 24 I. & N. Dec.

Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2009) (court of appeals will not consider on petition for review of removal order whether guilty plea was obtained in violation of constitutional rights: "On appeal, Lanferman first argues that the agency erred in relying on his guilty plea, because that plea was obtained in violation of certain constitutional rights. This 'contention is nothing more than a collateral attack on his state conviction. Collateral attacks are not available in a ... petition challenging the BIA's removal decision.'"); citing Abimbola v.

Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. Jul.14, 2009) ("a genuine factual dispute [exists] concerning the identity of Ayala's father and . . . the resolution of this factual dispute will determine whether or not Ayala acquired derivative citizenship. Accordingly, we transfer the proceedings to the [district court] for a new hearing on [his] nationality claim and a decision on that claim as if an action had been brought" for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201. 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5)(B)") (internal quotes omitted), citing Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).

Herrera-Castillo v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. Jul. 27, 2009) (inadmissibility for being unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more prevented adjustment of status, because 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) reasonably suggests that Congress considers aliens who accrue a period of unlawful presence more culpable than those immigration violators who do not, and thus that the former are less deserving of relief).