Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2009) (where a complaint was written in the disjunctive and the Ninth Circuit said, "but this minute order means he pled to all of it") Ngaeth doesn't mention Malta, so Malta isn't
necessarily overturned, but there is a definite conflict.

Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. August 29, 2007) (Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (Op. Att'y Gen.2002), disapproved of on other grounds by Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.2003), creating a presumption that a drug trafficking offense is a particularly serious crime was impermissibly retroactive as applied to noncitizen with conviction pre-dating that decision).



The test is this:

Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. Sept. 15, 2009) (8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1), barring motions to reopen filed by noncitizens who have already departed the United States, is a valid exercise of the Attorney General's Congressionally-delegated rule-making authority, and does not violate 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)(A) or (7)(A)).

Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2009) (California "conviction for receipt of stolen property under [Penal Code] 496(a) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because it does not require an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property. Castillo-Cruz's conviction is not a crime of moral turpitude under the modified categorical analysis, as the government conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence in the record establishing that his offense involved an intent to deprive the owner of possession permanently.").

Matter of AM, 25 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA Sept. 21, 2009) (notwithstanding the heading of INA 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) (2006), which only refers to nonpermanent residents, a lawful permanent resident who qualifies as a battered spouse may be eligible to apply for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(2)).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3653.pdf

Matter of AM, 25 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA Sept. 21, 2009) (given the nature and purpose of the relief of cancellation of removal for battered spouses under INA 240A(b)(2), such factors as a noncitizen's divorce from an abusive spouse, remarriage, and previous self-petition for relief based on the abusive marriage are relevant in determining whether an application for that relief should be granted in the exercise of discretion).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3653.pdf

Matter of Bulnes, 25 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 2009) (noncitizens departure from the United States while under outstanding in absentia order does not deprive the Immigration Judge of jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reopen to rescind the order if the motion is premised upon lack of notice).

United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 456 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2008) ("Based on the California Supreme Court's statement in Martinez, there is a 'realistic probability' that California 'would apply [ 207(a)] to conduct that falls outside the generic definition' of kidnapping. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 822, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); see also United States v. Ramos-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 400, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2009) (presentence reports are not part of the record of conviction for determining the nature of an offense).

United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1081-1082 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) (en banc) ("This assertion flies in the face of our presumption that a legislative body acts rationally when it enacts statutes, see Crandal v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc., 99 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir.1996) ("A statute should be read in a manner which attribute[s] a rational purpose to the legislature."), as well as the canon against converting statutory language into surplusage, see Am. Vantage Cos., 292 F.3d at 1098."(footnote omitted).").