Uppal v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (BIA's determination a conviction qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude is entitled to Skidmore deference: "The measure of deference due to the BIA's decision under Skidmore
varies 'depending upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140."); citing Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 911.

De la Rosa v. U.S. Attorney General, 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2009) (conviction of aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor disqualifies respondent from eligibility to apply for a waiver of deportation pursuant to the former INA 212(c), since the aggravated felony ground of removal has no statutory counterpart in the grounds of inadmissibility under INA 212(a) of the Act), following Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723, 727 (BIA 2005).

Whether serving time in jail prevents a person whose conviction has been expunged from qualifying under Lujan-Armendariz is an open question in the Ninth Cir. See, Ramirez-Altamirano v. Holder, 563 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2009). See also, Fernandez-Bernal v. Attorney General of U.S., 57 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir 2001) (relief under FFOA 3607(b) is not available to an individual sentenced to a term of probation that exceeds one year; nor is it available to anyone sentenced to jail time). Thanks to Stacy Tolchin

Matter of Evra, 25 I. & N. Dec. 79 (BIA Sept. 21, 2009) (the conduct underlying an aliens arrest and incarceration does not constitute "fault" within the meaning of section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2006), which provides that an order of removal issued at a hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded if the alien was in Federal or State custody at the time of the scheduled hearing and the failure to appear was "through no fault of the alien.").
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3654.pdf

United States v. Alba-Flores, 577 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2009) (defendant's prior expunged California convictions were not expunged for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, because under California law the expunged convictions in question could still be used at a later time in a variety of circumstances).

Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2009) ("a no contest plea to charges that merely restates the language of a statute that is not a categorical match cannot conclusively establish that a defendant admitted to conduct falling entirely within the generic federal definition of a crime."), citing United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2005).

Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2009) ("to identify a conviction as the generic offense through the modified categorical approach, when the record of conviction comprises only the indictment and the judgment, the judgment must contain the critical phrase as charged in the Information. "), quoting United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).

Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2009) ("a defendants nolo contendere plea pursuant to People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (Cal. 1970), does not establish factual guilt, and therefore, 'unless the record of the plea proceeding reflects that the defendant admitted to facts, a West plea, without more, does not establish the factual predicate to support a determination that the conviction was generic."), citing United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Uppal v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (Canadian conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Criminal Code of Canada 268(2) ("wounds, maims, disfigures, or endangers the life of" another), constituted a crime of moral turpitude, since the mens rea for assault is the intent to apply force intentionally or recklessly or being willfully blind to the fact that the victim does not consent) plus objective foresight of the risk of bodily harm), applying Matter of Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec.

Uppal v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (crimes requiring proof of only the general intent to commit an act may be considered crimes involving moral turpitude).



On this point, the court states: