Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448, 451 n.4 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2012) (argument that District of Columbia conviction of distribution of cocaine under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C. Code 24"901, et seq., did not constitute a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for immigration purposes, was waived since petitioner did not raise this argument in his brief on appeal); see United States v. Al"Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.

United States v. Miranda-Ortegon, 670 F.3d 661, 664, n.9, 11 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (court of appeal used Oklahoma criminal jury instructions to ascertain elements of state definition of offense, for purposes of determining the nature of the conviction for removal purposes).

Villegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. Jul. 30, 2010) (court had jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of a prior removal order, and REAL ID Act granted circuit courts jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law raised in the context of reinstatement proceedings; but evidence was sufficient to show prior order, and IJs failure in underlying deportation proceeding to inform alien that she could seek to withdraw her application for admission to United States did not violate alien's due process rights); Martinez-Merino v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 801 (9th Cir.

Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (state decision to try a youthful offender as a juvenile or as an adult determines whether juvenile has suffered a "conviction" for purposes of removal under the INA; federal immigration law distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders, and between minors tried as juveniles and those tried as adults, are rational and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).

Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012) (California misdemeanor conviction of disorderly conduct [soliciting an act of prostitution], in violation of Penal Code 647(b), categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, whether or not the defendant is the prostitute or the customer: We hold that soliciting an act of prostitution is not significantly less base, vile, and depraved than engaging in an act of prostitution.).

In Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. Feb.

Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2012) (California conviction of criminal threats, in violation of Penal Code 422, categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, for immigration purposes, because (1) the required threatened conduct is itself a CMT; (2) the victims must suffer sustained fear; and (3) the offense is committed with intent to instill fear), compare Fernandez"Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir.

Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (granting petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA in light of Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), which required reversal of the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner was ineligible for a waiver under former INA 212(c) because he failed to meet the comparability requirement).

Zarate v. Holder, 671 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (apprehension at border followed by arrest and being given the option of either seeing an IJ or withdrawing his application for admission and voluntarily returning to Mexico was sufficient to break continuous presence for non-LPR cancellation of removal), compare Valadez"Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 2010) (informal voluntary return, including making of a record of a turnaround, photographing and fingerprinting, does not break continuous residence).

Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. Oct. 17, 2011) (lawful entry as inspected backseat taxi passenger of previously deported person, without seeking the Attorney Generals permission to reapply for admission as she was required to do, under INA 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), constituted unlawful entry into the United States, under 8 C.F.R. 241.8(a)); following Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir.

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012).

The Court states:

Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).