Matter of Lanferman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 721 (BIA Mar. 9, 2012) (a criminal statute is divisible, regardless of its structure, if, based on the elements of the offense, some but not all violations of the statute give rise to grounds for removal or ineligibility for relief: [W]e have traditionally applied divisibility analysis to all manner of statutes, regardless of their structure. .

Matter of Svetislav Ilic, 25 I.& N. Dec. 717 (BIA 2012) (to independently qualify for adjustment of status under INA 245(i), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), as a derivative grandfathered alien, the principal beneficiary of the qualifying visa petition must satisfy the requirements for grandfathering, including the physical presence requirement of INA 245(i)(1)(C) of the Act, if applicable).

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012).

The Court states:

Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).

Possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), should not be considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Since possessing a firearm is not inherently evil and not malum prohibitum, the fact of being unlawfully undocumented when doing so should not make it a crime of moral turpitude. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990) (possessing a sawed-off shotgun not a crime of moral turpitude). See also Matter of Gabryelski, 20 I&N Dec.

Matter of Espinosa-Guillot, 25 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 2011) (an individual whose status was adjusted from parolee to lawful permanent resident pursuant to the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966 was admitted for purposes of removal under INA 237(a)); see Lanier v. U.S. Attorney General, 631 F.3d 363, 365-66 (11th Cir. 2011) (individual whose status was adjusted to permanent residence was not barred from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h)).

People v. Gabriel, 203 Cal.App.4th 199, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 (2d Dist. Feb. 3, 2012) (California conviction of possession of an assault weapon, in violation of Penal Code 12280(b), constituted a crime of moral turpitude, for purposes of impeachment of a witness with that conviction; Defendant's conviction of this charge required, at the least, that he should have known the weapon possessed the characteristics that made it particularly dangerous to human life. ( 12280, subd. (b); see In re Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p.

Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 F.3d 404 (2d cir. Feb. 24, 2012) (service of a Notice to Appear, which did not specify the time or date of the hearing, followed by an NTA that did, stopped the clock for the 10-year continuous presence requirement for non-LPR cancellation of removal under INA 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(A) as of the date of the second notice).

People v. Gabriel, 203 Cal.App.4th 199, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 (2d Dist. Feb. 3, 2012) (California conviction of cultivation of marijuana, in violation of Health and Safety Code 11358, constituted a crime of moral turpitude, for purposes of impeachment of a witness with that conviction; rejecting argument that the offense is not a CMT because, at its minimum, includes cultivation for personal use, and so it not necessarily related to drug trafficking).

Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (the circuit court has jurisdiction to entertain a timely petition to review of the denial of a motion to reconsider a decision of the BIA, regardless whether review was sought from the original BIA decision: An adverse BIA decision on the merits (and accompanying order of removal) and a BIA order denying a motion to reconsider are two separate final orders. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995).

Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356, 366, (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (Section 1182 provides for a waiver by the Attorney General of inadmissibility based on other forms of misrepresentation, see 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)(1); by implication, the bar to admissibility in 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) cannot be waived by the Attorney General. Pichardo v. INS, 216 F.3d 1198, 1201 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2000).).