Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. Mar. 29, 2012) (aggravated felony bar on eligibility for a waiver under INA 212(h) applies only to people who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents, not to those who later adjusted status to become lawful permanent residents); Lanier v. U.S. Attorney General, 631 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir. 2008); Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010) (Procedure, and not substance, is determinative of an admission into the United States under 1101(a)(13)(A) and 212(h).

Munoz-Pacheco v. Holder, 673 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2012) (court lacks jurisdiction to review hardship discretionary issue).

Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248, 1250-1251 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (The enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which repealed the waiver of deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), does not affect the right of aliens to use the 212(c) waiver, when such aliens proceeded to trial and were convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the enactment of IIRIRA.

Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (the seven years continuous presence requirement for lawful permanent residents under INA 212(h) is not impermissibly retroactive when proceedings were begun after the effective date of IIRAIRA).

New INA 216(g), Pub.L. 112-58, Nov. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 747 (adding 216(g) to toll time periods for filing a petition and appearing for an interview to remove the condition from permanent resident status during periods in which Armed Forces members are on active-duty serving abroad). Former INA 216(g) was redesignated as INA 216(h).

Matter of Lemus, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA Mar. 19, 2012) (adjustment of status under INA 245(i), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), is unavailable to an alien who is inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), absent a waiver); clarifying Matter of Lemus, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373 (BIA 2007).

Note: There is one very positive aspect of this decision, namely that the case was remanded to the IJ because ten years has, after years of litigation, now passed since Mr. Lemus departed the United States.

Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1479 (Mar. 29, 2012) (INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), providing that the commission of a criminal offense identified in INA 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), is an exception to the presumption that a LPR returning from abroad is not seeking admission and is therefore subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, does not apply to criminal offenses committed on or prior to Sept. 30, 1996, the effective date of IIRAIRA).

Matter of Lanferman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 721 (BIA Mar. 9, 2012) (a criminal statute is divisible, regardless of its structure, if, based on the elements of the offense, some but not all violations of the statute give rise to grounds for removal or ineligibility for relief: [W]e have traditionally applied divisibility analysis to all manner of statutes, regardless of their structure. .

Matter of Svetislav Ilic, 25 I.& N. Dec. 717 (BIA 2012) (to independently qualify for adjustment of status under INA 245(i), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), as a derivative grandfathered alien, the principal beneficiary of the qualifying visa petition must satisfy the requirements for grandfathering, including the physical presence requirement of INA 245(i)(1)(C) of the Act, if applicable).

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (statutes should be interpreted to avoid superfluity) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004) ([O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons is that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant....)).