Penuliar v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("Finally, insofar as the IJ relied on the probation report to establish that Penuliar pled guilty to a "crime of violence," he was in error. See, e.g., United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 n.25 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000)) (explaining that a presentence report, even when considered in conjunction with charging papers, is insufficient to establish what facts a defendant admitted in his plea).").

Acosta v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2008) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear petition for review of order denying continuance of removal proceedings, which presented only a "garden variety" abuse of discretion claim, rather than a constitutional claim or question of law sufficient to confer jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D)).

Acosta v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2008) (court of appeal lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear petition for review because petitioner's conviction was a crime "related to a controlled substance" under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); and (2)).

Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800, ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) ("Moreover, unlike the federal aiding and abetting statute involved in James, the federal misprision of a felony statute defines a separate offense, distinct from the underlying felony. See James, 464 F.3d at 510 n. 24 (citing Londono-Gomez v. INS, 699 F.2d 475, 476 (9th Cir.1983)). Thus, the fact that Patel was specifically indicted for misprision of a bank fraud is irrelevant to our inquiry of whether the statutory definition of the offense itself necessarily entails fraud or deceit.").

Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800, ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) (the elements of the federal offense of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, were described as "(1) knowledge that a felony was committed; (2) failure to notify the authorities of the felony; and (3) an affirmative step to conceal the felony. See United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir.1992). "[U]nder the misprision statute, the defendant must commit an affirmative act to prevent discovery of the earlier felony." Id. "Mere failure to make known does not suffice." Id. at 508-09 (citation omitted).

United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) (Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not require district court to rule on defendant's objections to information contained in his PSR).

Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800, ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) (court of appeals enforces record of conviction limitation, of categorical analysis, and holds it improper to go beyond record of conviction where the statute defining the offense of conviction does not contain disjunctive elements or divisible subsections creating multiple offenses: "The purpose of the categorical approach is to avoid "the practical difficulties and fairness problems that would arise if courts were permitted to consider the facts behind prior convictions ....

Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800, ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) ("The purpose of the categorical approach is to avoid "the practical difficulties and fairness problems that would arise if courts were permitted to consider the facts behind prior convictions .... [which] would potentially require federal courts to relitigate a defendant's prior conviction in any case where the government alleged that the defendant's actual conduct fit the definition of a predicate offense."), quoting Larin-Ullo v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir.2006), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

Nijhawan v. Attorney General, 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. May 2, 2008) (rejecting argument that loss must be established beyond a reasonable doubt by criminal court: "we should not raise an aspect of an immigration statute to the level of an element of a criminal offense, as the dissent urges, merely because requiring that it be a part of the conviction eases a courts decision-making process.")

Nijhawan v. Attorney General, 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. May 2, 2008) ("The Courts of Appeals have transplanted that categorical approach into the INA because of obvious similarities between the two inquiries. The plain language of the INA, like 924(e), mandates that the alien was "convicted" of the prior offense designated in the INA as an "aggravated felony." It is not sufficient for the BIA to
independently conclude that the alien "has committed" that prior offense.