Marquez Carillo v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), corporal injury of a spouse, is a domestic violence offense under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for removal purposes).

Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015) (mandatory detention under INA 236(c) may be imposed even if the migrant is taken into ICE custody six days after being released from criminal custody).

United States v. Munyenyezi, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1323336 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 2015) (18 U.S.C. 1425(a) requires proof that the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988); 18 U.S.C. 1425(b), makes it a crime for a person to knowingly ... procure ... naturalization ...

United States v. Ngige, ___ F.3d ___ (1st Cir. Mar. 17, 2015) (the charge was filed within the five-year statute of limitations, since defendant's submission of a psychological evaluation in support of her Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) petition was properly considered an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy charged; since the conspiracy's objective was to pay the co-conspirators to help defendant "acquire a change of her immigration status" by "making false representations about her marriage and relationship," the psychological evaluation sought to achieve that goal).

In jurisdictions in which the target offense is an element of conspiracy, then that offense would be an aggravated felony if the target offense is an aggravated felony. In California, however, the target offense of a conspiracy not an element of the offense, since the jury need not unanimously agree on the identity of the target offense. The California conspiracy offense is therefore indivisible with respect to the target offense, and the modified categorical analysis does not apply.

Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (New York convictions for child endangerment under New York State Penal Law 260.10(1) [knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child], including driving under the influence of alcohol while children were in the car, constituted child abuse, under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), even though no harm came to a child; the reviewing court must grant Chevron deference to the BIA), citing Matter of Velazquez"Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec.

Matter of Cerda Reyes, 26 I&N Dec. 528 (BIA 2015) (Immigration Judge erred in dismissing respondents bond determination for lack of jurisdiction when respondent was transferred to detention center outside Immigration Judges jurisdiction).

Whether an plea of not guilty by reason of insanity plea is a conviction for immigration purposes is still unsettled. In an insanity case, the actual plea is not "guilty except for ..." It is "not guilty by reason of insanity." That is because insanity negates an essential element of the offense: the intent. Therefore, a "not guilty by reason of insanity" finding is arguably not a conviction. Unfortunately, in California and other states, you first have to enter an actual guilty plea prior to being found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Mena-Flores v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 294629 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (even though noncitizen was acquitted of drug-trafficking criminal charges, substantial evidence supported determination that there was reason to believe that noncitizen had participated in drug trafficking, triggering inadmissiblity under INA 212(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)(i)); but see e.g., Garces v. Att'y Gen., 611 F.3d 1337, 1350 (11th Cir.2010) (reversing a finding of reason to believe based only on a vacated plea and some hearsay in police reports); Igwebuike v. Caterisano, 230 F.

Health & Safety Code 11350-11352. Formerly, these offenses covered certain substances that were not on the federal list, and these statutes were therefore divisible for purposes of removal and eligibility for relief under the strict standards of Moncrieffe and Descamps. For example, the government conceded in Esquivel-Garcia v. Holder, 593 F. 3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) that 11350 was divisible, but the conviction in that case occurred in 1989 when schedule II at HS 11055(b) (referenced by 11350) still included apomorphine, which is specifically excluded from the federal CSA.