United States v. Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591244 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2015) (information in presentence investigation report was sufficient to prove conviction was money-laundering aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because the $10,000 requirement for the amount of funds laundered is a circumstance-specific element of the aggravated felony definition, which could be proven by evidence outside the elements of the offense and outside the traditional record of conviction); see United States v.

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S. 13"1204(A), is overbroad with respect to 18 U.S.C. 16, because the definition of assault in subsection (1) of the Arizona statute includes simple recklessness, whereas a crime of violence requires a mens rea of at least heightened recklessness, see United States v. Gomez"Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012), and is divisible); see United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S. 13"1203(A)(2) is categorically a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16, and INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because it is an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.); following United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir.2014).

United States v. Simmons, 782 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (Hawaii conviction of second-degree escape from custody, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes 710"1021, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) 4B1.1(a), because it includes both active and passive forms of escape); see Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126"27, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009).

Matter of Gonzalez, 24 I&N Dec. 549 (BIA 2008) (a single act of soliciting an act of prostitution on ones own behalf does not fall within INA 212(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii), where this case involved a disorderly conduct conviction relating to soliciting an act of prostitution).

Note: In California, prostitution is defined as sexual intercourse for a fee, while Penal Code 273(b) covers asking for, offering, or providing lewd conduct for a fee. Lewd conduct is more broadly defined than intercourse, and the statute is not divisible.

Villanueva v. Holder, 784 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. Apr. 24, 2015) (Connecticut conviction for assault in the third degree, under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"61, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), where the record of conviction did not indicate the subdivision under which the noncitizen was convicted, since two of the three sections involved only recklessness or negligence which are insufficient intent to constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16).

There is a new article, "Race, immigration, & imprisonment in the United States," at http://crimmigration.com. Here is an excerpt: The United States sordid history with race-based policing is too well known to need recounting. Often forgotten, though, is that race-based policing continues to receive the Supreme Courts blessing when it comes to immigration law. In a pair of decisions from the mid-1970s, the Court allowed immigration officials to explicitly consider whether someone looks Mexican [...].
Thanks to Csar Cuauhtmoc Garca Hernndez at crimmigration.com

Carrillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (California conviction of corporal injury of a spouse, in violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), categorically constitutes a crime of domestic violence, under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), because all of the protected relationships covered by the state offense fall within the definition of the domestic violence ground of deportation).

United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2015) (amending and superseding opinion denying rehearing en banc) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes, since United States v. Grajeda, which held that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, is still good law even in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 1181 (2012), and People v.

United States v. Mendez-Sosa, 778 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) (New Jersey conviction of criminal sexual contact, in violation of NJS 2C:14-3(b), is a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, as a forcible sex offense; district court properly applied divisible statute analysis to determine defendant was convicted of subsection that involved absence of consent).