Mutascu v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (California conviction of petty theft with a prior, in violation of Penal Code 666, with one-year sentence imposed is an aggravated felony theft offense), rejecting United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0460708cv0p.pdf

United States v. Pintado-Isiordia, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 26, 2006) (per curiam) (because record unclear whether district court relied on categorical approach, or modified categorical approach, defendants sentence for illegal reentry was vacated and remanded for district court determination as to whether prior conviction for assault with a firearm qualifies as a "crime of violence" under either approach).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0550489p.pdf

United States v. Meza-Corrales, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11199 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2006) (motion to dismiss illegal reentry charge granted on ground immigration judge violated due process by bypassing categorical analysis of Oregon conviction of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree, in violation of O.R.S.

Canada v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1367367 (2d Cir. May 18, 2006) (Connecticut conviction for assault on a public safety officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-167c(a)(1) is a divisible statute, since assault of a police officer is a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), but assault of another peace office may not categorically qualify as a crime of violence; where plea transcript shows victim was, in fact, a police officer, the Government has met its burden of showing removability as an aggravated felon).

United States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2006) (examining for plain error, the court found that where the complaint charges defendant under a subsection of a divisible statute that is a categorical crime of violence, but the plea colloquy does not indicate any specific subsection, it is not plain error for the illegal re-entry sentencing court to find that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the subsection charged in the complaint).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0540289cr0p.pdf

Savoury v. United States Atty Gen., __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. May 25, 2006) (noncitizen who was inadmissible at time of adjustment of status, but was allowed to adjust status by mistake, is not a noncitizen lawfully admitted to the United States for purposes of demonstrating eligibility for relief under former INA 212(c)).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/11th/0510966p.pdf

Matter of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956) (noncitizen in deportation proceedings allowed to apply for INA 212(c) relief where noncitizen had traveled out of the United States after conviction but before the deportation proceedings, on the theory that the INS should not have admitted the person after the conviction without a 212(c) waiver and that an IJ can grant the 212(c) waiver nunc pro tunc to the prior post-conviction/pre-deportation proceedings entry).  See also, Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (BIA 1971).

Rivas-Gomez v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (BIA erred in applying heightened exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in application for INA 209(c) waiver without first determining, on the basis of the underlying facts, whether conviction for statutory rape was a violent or dangerous crime).

Matter of Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236 (BIA 1974) requires an "affirmative communication" from the DHS to allow an IJ to terminate proceedings to allow a noncitizen to apply for naturalization. This requirement has arguably been superceded by current 8 C.F.R. 1239(f), which no longer requires an affirmative communication.

Apr 96 Gen Co memo 96-5