United States v. Matthews, 374 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. July 7, 2004) (conviction of burglary of an occupied
building did not constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2), where the parties agreed the term "occupied"
did not require a persons actual physical presence).

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
364 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (California conviction
for burglary of an inhabited building, under California Penal
Code § 460, is an aggravated felony and a "crime of violence"
for sentencing purposes).

Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591
(5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of
vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with
sentence of five years deferred adjudication, constituted
crime of violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes
of deportation).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th
Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas
conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended
sentence of four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient
to render noncitizen deportable).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d
788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069, 121
S.Ct. 757 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle
with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 30.04(a) (West 1987), with suspended sentence of four years
imprisonment, was a "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v. Ramos-Garcia,
95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1083 (1997) (Texas conviction for burglary of vehicle in violation
of Penal Code § 30.04 (1993) was an "aggravated felony
" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) sentence enhancement
for illegal re-entry after deportation, despite change in
Texas law, Texas Penal Code Ann.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of automobile, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04 (1994),
was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of nonresidential building in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 30.02 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Guadardo,
40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994) (Texas conviction of burglary
of habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 was
a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation).

Rios-Delgado v. United States, 117 F.Supp.2d 581 (W.D.Tex.
Oct. 11, 2000) (California: trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to object, at sentencing, that defendants prior
conviction for commercial burglary was not an aggravated felony,
for sentence enhancement purposes, under the soon-to-be-announced
rule of United States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826 (5th
Cir.