United States v. Anderson, 989 F.2d 310 (9th
Cir. 1993) (Washington: outlining generic definition of extortion
by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1951 federal definition for purposes
of career offender sentencing enhancement).

Sui v. INS, 250
F.3d 105 (2d Cir. May 11, 2001) (federal conviction of violating
18 U.S.C. § 513(a), possession of counterfeit securities with
intent to deceive, does not constitute a deportable aggravated
felony as a conviction of an offense involving fraud, under
INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since
the loss to the victims as a result of defendants actions
did not exceed $10,000).

Zhang
v. United States, 401 F.Supp.2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2005)
(introducing a drug that had been misbranded with the intent
to defraud and mislead, into interstate commerce, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), did not constitute an aggravated felony
fraud offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).

Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591
(5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of
vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with
sentence of five years deferred adjudication, constituted
crime of violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes
of deportation).

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
364 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (California conviction
for burglary of an inhabited building, under California Penal
Code § 460, is an aggravated felony and a "crime of violence"
for sentencing purposes).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th
Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas
conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended
sentence of four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient
to render noncitizen deportable).

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d
788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069, 121
S.Ct. 757 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle
with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 30.04(a) (West 1987), with suspended sentence of four years
imprisonment, was a "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v. Ramos-Garcia,
95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1083 (1997) (Texas conviction for burglary of vehicle in violation
of Penal Code § 30.04 (1993) was an "aggravated felony
" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) sentence enhancement
for illegal re-entry after deportation, despite change in
Texas law, Texas Penal Code Ann.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of automobile, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04 (1994),
was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman,
56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary
of nonresidential building in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 30.02 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.