United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2006) (sentence for illegal re-entry after prior deportation (in 1997) could not be further enhanced because of 2002 aggravated felony conviction, under 18 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2), since the aggravated felony conviction did not occur prior to the 1997 deportation).

Cardozo-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006) (8 C.F.R. 1003.2, providing that motion to reopen removal proceedings could not be made subsequent to removal, did not preclude BIA from ruling on motion to reopen after conviction that formed the a key part of the basis of the removal order had been vacated; it was not necessary that the conviction be the sole reason for removal).

Cardozo-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006) (conviction vacated for any procedural or substantive defect has been eliminated for immigration purposes, and cannot trigger removal, whereas conviction vacated for equitable, rehabilitative, or immigration purposes unrelated to the merits of the conviction remains), following Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), reversed on other grounds in Pickering v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. July 17, 2006).

Cardozo-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006) ("for the government to carry its burden in establishing that a conviction remains valid for immigration purposes, the government must prove "with clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, that the Petitioner's conviction was quashed solely for rehabilitative reasons or reasons related to his immigration status, i.e., to avoid adverse immigration consequences.") (original emphasis), citing Pickering v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006), vacating Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003).

Singh v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2006) (failure to voluntarily depart barred adjustment of status, under 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), following grant of motion to reopen).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/055181p.pdf

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona court order issued in 2004, acknowledging that 1994 order imposing a twelve-month sentence, for Arizona misdemeanor conviction was illegal since the state at the time of sentence designated the conviction a misdemeanor, and under Arizona law the maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor was then six months, see A.R.S.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) ("Whether a state statutory crime necessarily involves moral turpitude is a question of law that we review de novo."), citing Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) ("Whether a particular offense constitutes an aggravated felony for which an alien is removable is also subject to de novo review."), citing Rivas-Gomez v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).

Yeghiazaryan v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir.2005) (questions of whether offense is an aggravated felony is reviewed de novo, with deference generally afforded to the BIA's interpretation of the immigration laws "unless that interpretation is contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute."), quoting Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.2004).

In Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006), the Ninth Circuit outlined the test for determining whether a conviction constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for deportation purposes: