Eleventh Circuit Finds IJ Has Jurisdiction Over In Absentia Motion to Reopen Filed From Outside of the U.S. Contreras-Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General. 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). Petitioner was ordered removed in absentia and removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen to rescind the in absentia order based on lack of notice. The IJ denied the motion, concluding that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because petitioner was outside of the United States. The BIA affirmed the dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit found that petitioners motion was governed by 8 C.F.R.

The main obstacle to obtaining a client's release from custody of an ICE detainer is lack of understanding about what a detainer is and about how quickly (or not) a person can be removed. The criminal bondsman will not write a criminal bond if they think the person is going to be immediately deported. The court and the bondsman often think that an immigration detainer means that the client will be immediately deported. Counsel has to educate them as to why that is not the case. The ICE detainer does nothing to prevent the jail from releasing the client.

Lino v. Gonzales. 467 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2006) (INA 241(a)(5) precludes a previously removed alien who has since illegally reentered the United States from adjusting status under INA 245(i), and petitioner does not fall within any exemption to this statute).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/051078p.pdf

Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 118, 119 (BIA 1960) (noncitizen not barred from establishing GMC under INA 101(f)(6) when s/he makes a voluntary and timely retraction of attempted false testimony); cf. Matter of Namio, 14 I. & N. Dec. 412, 414 (BIA 1973) (recantation of false testimony about one year later when disclosure of its falsity was imminent was neither a voluntary recantation nor a timely retraction and thus did not remove the bar to showing GMC under INA 101(f)(6)).

Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (all presumptions normally operating in favor of the judgment operate in favor of the validity of a Judicial Recommendation Aagainst Deportation, and the burden is on the government to prove the criminal resentencing was granted solely to enable the court to issue a timely JRAD or else the JRAD would be held effective).

Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2006) (Attorney General's heightened "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard, under Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373, 383 (A.G. 2002), for aliens convicted of "violent or dangerous" criminal acts who seek to adjust status under INA 209(c), 8 U.S.C. 1159(c)); accord, Rivas-Gomez v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006); Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2006).

Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2006) (a conviction does not have to be an aggravated felony in order to be found a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal; Wisconsin conviction of substantial battery with intent to cause substantial bodily harm by using a dangerous weapon in violation of Wis.Stat. 940.19(3), 939.63, a particularly serious crime, even if not an aggravated felony).

Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2006)(court of appeals has jurisdiction to review BIA finding of particularly serious crime to determine whether it employed proper legal standard, since questions of law are presented because petitioner challenges the BIA's interpretation of the term "particularly serious crime" in the asylum and withholding statutes).

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. October 26, 2006)(en banc) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1), 13-601 ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Martinez-Martinez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2006) (Arizona conviction of discharging firearm at a residence, in violation of A.R.S. 13-1211, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for purposes imposing a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry, under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because the statute of conviction encompassed any structure capable of being occupied as a residence, even though it was not presently so occupied), distinguishing United States v. Cortez-Arizs, 403 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.