Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438
F.3d 86 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (Rhode Island conviction
of third-degree sexual assault, in violation of R.I. Gen.

United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d
789 (3d Cir. Apr.

Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833 (4th
Cir. May 4, 2000) (Virginia conviction of misdemeanor sexual
battery, in violation of Va.Code 1950, § 18.2-67.4, was a
crime of violence, and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration
purposes precluding judicial review of a removal order), distinguished
by Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001).

United
States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2006) (Minnesota felony conviction for third degree
sexual conduct, under Minn. Stat. 8 § 609.344, is not necessarily
a "forcible sex offense," and therefore not categorically
a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

United States v. Meraz-Enriquez,
__ F.3d __, 2006 WL 515477 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006)
(Kansas conviction of attempted sexual battery, in violation
of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21- 3518, which punishes a sexual touching
of a person who is too intoxicated to be able to give consent
to the touching, is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry
sentencing purposes because the offense does not require the
use of force).

United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,
374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Missouri conviction
of sexual assault, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.040(1)
committed if "he has sexual intercourse with another
person knowing that he does so without that persons consent,"
did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
cmt. n.1(B)(ii), for purposes of 16-level enhancement of sentence
for illegal re-entry).

United
States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1122 n. 4 (6th Cir. July 13,
1995) (Tennessee conviction for assault with intent to commit
sexual battery is not categorically a "crime of violence"
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon with a firearm)
because the minimum conduct of the offense can be committed
through force or coercion).

United States v. Marin-Navarette,
244 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 317 (2001) (Washington conviction of third-degree child
molestation constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor,"
and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of enhancing illegal
re-entry sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

United States v. Rutherford,
175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. May 13, 1999) (Florida conviction
for lewd assault of minor, in violation of Florida Statutes
§ 800.04, was a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing
defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1).

Matter of Small, 23 I.
& N. Dec. 448 (BIA June 4, 2002) (en banc) (New York misdemeanor
conviction of sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of N.Y.
Penal Law § 130.60(2), with a sentence of one year in custody,
constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).