Brezilien v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. May 12, 2009) (BIA violated its own regulation when it engaged in de novo factfinding to deny claim for immigration relief, improperly reversing IJs factual finding without applying the clearly erroneous standard of review).

Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 824 (BIA May 8, 2009) (the terms "child" and "parent" defined at 8 U.S.C. 1101(c), do not encompass stepchildren and stepparents; a person born outside the United States cannot derive United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 1431(a), by virtue of his or her relationship to a nonadoptive stepparent).

Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. May 20, 2009) (since the statute is unambiguous, the court need not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis).

Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. May 20, 2009) (since the statute is unambiguous, the court need not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis).

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) (BIA made legal error by overlooking and mischaracterizing medical facts relevant to determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation of removal)

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) ("Under our decision in Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL ID Act restores our jurisdiction to review "constitutional claims or questions of law," 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), and our decision in Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2008), that we can review the determination of whether "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is present in those rare cases where a BIA decision rests on fact-finding "which is flawed by an error of law," id. at 40")

United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. May 20, 2009) (district court had no authority to order that the supervised release term of illegal reentry sentence be tolled as long as defendant remained outside of the United States following his possible removal after his prison term, because tolling is not a "condition" of supervised release within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 3583(d)).

United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2009) (in considering whether state conviction falls within federal statutory category for criminal sentencing purposes, under the categorical analysis, the state label or name for the offense does not control), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).

United States v. Andrade-Aguilar, 570 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. May 27, 2009) (defendant's first state drug possession conviction was not "final" before commission of second possession offense, and thus second offense could not be aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 309, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2284 (2001) ("The title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive purposes, it is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase.")